

**Security Council**

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Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Yemen*Summary*

The present report is the first to deal specifically with the situation of children and armed conflict in Yemen. The report, which covers the period from July 2011 to March 2013, contains detailed information on incidents of all six types of grave violations against children, by both the armed forces and armed groups in Yemen. Such incidents include recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape and other grave acts of sexual violence, abductions and attacks on schools and hospitals, as well as denial of humanitarian access.

Children in Yemen continue to be victims of grave child rights violations. Overall, violations such as attacks on schools and hospitals and the killing of children have decreased during the course of the reporting period as a result of reduced numbers of incidents of armed violence and civil unrest and the progress made in the implementation of Yemen's Transition Agreement, signed in Riyadh on 23 November 2011. However, there has been an increase in the numbers of child casualties related to mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war. Incidents of association of children with armed forces and armed groups, as well as attacks on schools, also continue to be reported. During the course of the reporting period, the United Nations and its partners progressively expanded their monitoring and reporting network, which has contributed to an increase in verified reports of the recruitment and use of children by the armed forces and various armed groups, as well as of cases of sexual violence and the killing and maiming of children by mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war.

The report highlights the need to implement specific measures to address and prevent grave child rights violations. It outlines the efforts and commitments made by the Government of Yemen and the Al-Houthi armed groups following the visit of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, including commitments obtained from the Government of Yemen to develop a concrete and time-bound action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in the Yemeni Armed Forces, and from Al-Houthi to continue the dialogue with the United Nations on this matter. Specific recommendations are made to strengthen measures to prevent and end grave rights violations against children in Yemen.



I. Introduction

1. The present report, prepared pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011), covers the period from July 2011 to March 2013 and documents violations committed against children in Yemen. The report, presented to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, is the first report on grave child rights violations in Yemen to be prepared by the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting, which was established in October 2012. The report identifies parties to the conflict responsible for grave violations and abuses committed against children and highlights areas for advocacy and response to enhance the protection of children affected by the conflict in Yemen. The report also contains specific recommendations addressed to all parties to the conflict.

2. In 2011, monitoring and reporting activities were hindered not only by the continuing civil unrest and an upsurge in the armed conflict but by the absence of a formally established monitoring and reporting mechanism. Various factors limited the gathering of information and data, including the security situation, reduced international presence, limited humanitarian access and the polarization of civil society organizations, which had a negative effect on the work of United Nations implementing partners. Furthermore, monitoring and reporting of grave child rights violations in the area controlled by Al-Houthi in Sa'ada governorate were difficult owing to restricted humanitarian space, as well as a social tolerance whereby the association of children with the Al-Houthi group is considered by communities as an obligation to protect their land, themselves and their families rather than a violation of children's rights. Given these limitations, the incidents and trends described below only partially reflect the actual violations committed against children in Yemen.

3. In 2011, the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/65/820-S/2011/250) listed the pro-Government tribal militias and the Al-Houthi armed group as parties that recruit and use children in armed conflict. In the 2012 annual report (A/66/782-S/2012/261), the Yemeni Armed Forces and the First Armoured Division (FAD) were also listed as parties that recruit and use children. In June 2013, Ansar al-Sharia was added to the list for recruitment and use of children (see A/67/845-S/2013/245).

II. Political and military developments

A. Political developments in Yemen

4. Yemen is among the poorest countries in the world, with the highest birth rate and the second highest child malnutrition rate. Its population includes 1 million children under 5 years of age who are acutely malnourished, 250,000 of whom are considered severely malnourished.

5. In the wake of popular protests in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February 2011, respectively, civil unrest erupted in Yemen, leading to violent clashes between protesters and security forces. These events resulted in a protracted political stalemate over President Ali Abdullah Saleh's future rule. On 18 March, dozens of unarmed protesters in Sana'a and Taiz were killed in clashes with security forces. As

a result, a number of Government officials resigned and joined the opposition, including the Minister of Human Rights and the Attorney General. General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Commander of FAD, also sided with the opposition and deployed his troops to protect anti-Government protesters. President Saleh reacted by dismissing the Cabinet and declaring a state of emergency. In an attempt to overcome the political deadlock and prevent further deterioration of the situation, I asked my Special Adviser on Yemen to exercise my good offices to engage with all sides in Yemen, working closely with the members of the Security Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other international partners. On 22 May, an initiative by GCC for a transfer of power from the President to the Vice-President was signed by the ruling party and the opposition, but not by President Saleh, resulting in a continued stalemate. On 3 June, the mosque inside the Presidential Palace was attacked, seriously injuring President Saleh and other senior officials, which further increased the political crisis and the number of violent incidents.

6. Against this background, the Security Council, on 21 October, unanimously adopted resolution 2014 (2011), in which it demanded that all sides immediately reject the use of violence and called upon all parties to commit themselves to the implementation of a political settlement based upon the GCC initiative.

7. At the request of the Yemeni parties, my Special Adviser on Yemen facilitated direct face-to-face negotiations, building on the efforts of GCC and other international partners. These negotiations resulted in the signing, on 23 November, by President Saleh, the ruling General People's Congress and the opposition Joint Meeting Parties), of a comprehensive Transition Agreement, the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism, for a two-year period. The Agreement provides for the transfer of power from the President to the Vice-President. The first phase of the transition concluded with the election on 21 February 2012 of Vice-President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi as the new President. Subsequently, the Government of National Unity was formed, headed by Prime Minister Mohamed Salem Basendwah. The second phase, currently under way, includes the convening of the National Dialogue Conference, which began its proceedings on 18 March 2013 and is to last six months, a constitution-making process, and general elections.

8. Despite the progress made in the transition process, Yemen continues to face many challenges, with the political process not yet translated into consolidated stability and security gains throughout.

9. Since 2009, approximately 280,000 people have been displaced as a result of the six rounds of conflict, which brought the Al-Houthi armed group to control Sa'ada governorate. Al-Houthi continues to encroach into Government-controlled areas, such as Al-Jawf, Amran and Hajjah governorates, resulting in frequent clashes with Government forces, armed Salafists and armed tribal groups.

10. In the southern governorates, intense armed clashes have continued throughout the reporting period between Government armed forces and Ansar al-Sharia, a group associated with Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. By 12 June 2012, the Government announced that it had regained full control over Zinjibar and Ja'ar districts, which had been strongholds of the armed group since May 2011. However, armed clashes between the Government armed forces and Ansar al-Sharia have continued.

11. On 12 June 2012, the Security Council, in its resolution 2051 (2012), demanded the cessation of all actions aimed at undermining the Government of National Unity and the political transition, including continued attacks on oil, gas and electricity infrastructure, and interference with decisions relating to the restructuring of the armed and security forces. It also expressed its readiness to consider further measures, including under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, if such actions continued.

12. Following the Security Council mission to Yemen on 27 January 2013, the Security Council, on 15 February 2013, reiterated these concerns (see S/PRST/2013/3), as well as its concerns for children affected by the armed conflict in Yemen.

B. Military developments in Yemen

Yemeni Armed Forces

13. According to Yemeni law, the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) consist of the Yemen Land Force, Yemeni Air Force, Yemeni Navy and Coastal Forces and any other forces established by the National Defence Council and approved by Parliament. The armed forces also include the elite Republican Guard, present throughout Yemen but concentrated near the main towns, and the border guards. In March 2011, General Ali Mohsen, Commander of the First Armoured Division (FAD) and the north-eastern region, defected to the opposition. However, following the signing of the Transition Agreement in November 2011, efforts are under way to reintegrate FAD into YAF. In addition, a security force under the Ministry of Interior, known as the Central Security Forces, consists of several brigades, including one which specializes in riot control.

14. Furthermore, pursuant to the Transition Agreement, a Military Affairs Committee was established to end divisions within the armed forces; settle all armed conflicts; end all militarized structures, with all militia and other armed groups moved from the capital and other cities; remove all unlawful checkpoints; and reintegrate the armed forces into a unified, professional command structure. The Committee is also tasked with screening out all those within the armed forces who do not fit the military criteria and assisting with their reintegration into the community.

15. On 6 April 2012, President Hadi issued a series of decrees to promote the modernization of the Yemeni military, which involved new appointments as well as the transfer to new positions of senior civilian and military personnel, including relatives and loyalists of former President Saleh. This triggered tensions that lasted several weeks but which were resolved through the facilitation efforts of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen. On 19 December, the President issued another decree, defining a new structure for armed forces composed of land, air, naval and border forces, abolishing the Republican Guard and FAD and appointing new commanders for a number of army units, including the Central Security Forces. This was followed by a further Presidential decree issued on 21 February 2013, formally declaring the restructuring of the Ministry of Interior, which included renaming the Central Security Forces as the Special Security Forces. Another decree was issued on 10 April, which announced the removal of the Commanders of both the Republican Guard and FAD.

Pro-Government tribal militias

16. The pro-Government armed militias (known as the popular army) are considered to be Government-backed, tribe-based reserve forces which, in times of conflict, mobilize their members to support YAF. The National Defence Council operates recruitment centres and military training camps in support of YAF. The Ministry of Defence provides these tribes with training, weapons and salaries and assigns regular army commanders to lead the popular army units. These tribe-based armed forces were mobilized to fight the Al-Houthi armed group during the six rounds of conflict and supported former President Saleh during the civil unrest. Popular committees, established by tribes and government officials from southern governorates, also supported YAF during the offensives against Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia that resulted in the regaining of control over Abyan.

Al-Houthi armed group

17. The Al-Houthi armed group, referred to by its members as Ansar Allah, is based in Sa'ada governorate and led by Abdul Malik Al-Houthi. This group follows Zaidism, a Shia Muslim school of thought named after Zayd ibn Ali, the grandson of Hussein ibn Ali. The Al-Houthi movement, a religious minority on the border with Saudi Arabia, emerged to seek autonomy from the Yemeni State and to redress socioeconomic grievances and historic marginalization.

18. By means of several armed uprisings against YAF since 2004 and over six rounds of conflict, the Al-Houthi armed group has managed over time to gain control over all of Sa'ada governorate, and even encroached into parts of the neighbouring governorates of Amran, Al-Jawf and Hajjah. In February 2010, the group signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government, which still remains in effect.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia

19. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula is an armed group that was formed in January 2009 following a merger of Al-Qaida in Yemen and Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia. It is a militant insurgent organization considered subordinate to Al-Qaida. In May 2011, following intense armed clashes against YAF, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, together with the locally rooted militant insurgent group, Jama'at Ansar al-Sharia, known as Ansar al-Sharia (supporters of Islamic law), took control of Abyan governorate. As a result, more than 100,000 people were displaced until June 2012, when the Government regained control. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates have continued to carry out terrorist-style attacks in habwa and Abyan governorates, and is also claiming responsibility for the suicide attack in Sana'a on 21 May 2012, which killed more than 100 military personnel and injured more than 200 who were rehearsing for Yemen's Unity Day parade.

III. Grave violations against children

20. The civil unrest that started in February 2011 has severely affected the Yemeni population, particularly children. Since then, the United Nations and its partners have witnessed the widespread presence of armed elements in the major cities, including the visible affiliation of children with various armed forces and armed

groups. In February 2012, the peaceful transfer of power and the start of the two-year transition contributed to the decrease in the killing and maiming of children caused by live ammunition, both in crossfire and through indiscriminate shelling, in the major cities of Sana'a and Taiz. However, other violations, including the recruitment and use of children for military purposes, appear to be on the increase, mainly in Abyan governorate and Sana'a city. In particular, child casualties due to mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war increased in the conflict areas of Sa'ada and Abyan and peaked in the third quarter of 2012 following the return of internally displaced persons to areas highly contaminated with unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war. A sharp reduction was subsequently observed in areas where mine action teams were given access and undertook clearance.

21. Incidents of rape and sexual violence have only begun to be reported recently, most likely owing to the improved humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas and the strengthened capacity of the United Nations and its partners to engage with the communities. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered to be generally underreported in Yemen, as rape survivors are often condemned and ostracized if they become known.

Challenges regarding verification of cases

22. The United Nations in Yemen continued to face challenges in monitoring and reporting of grave violations against children, particularly in 2011 during the height of the civil unrest and conflict when a formal monitoring and reporting mechanism had not yet been established, most international humanitarian staff had been evacuated and the social environment was generally politicized. This affected the work of local implementing partners, while the ongoing armed conflict in governorates such as Abyan, Hajjah, Al-Jawf and Sa'ada impeded efforts to monitor grave violations and obtain reliable data and information.

A. Recruitment and use of children

23. During the reporting period, the United Nations documented 84 cases of recruitment and use of children. Of these cases, 69, all involving boys aged between 10 and 17 years, were verified by the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting.

Yemeni Armed Forces

24. Thirty-eight children, aged from 14 to 17 years, were recruited by YAF (16 by the Republican Guard, 14 by FAD, 5 by the military police and 3 by the Central Security Forces). The verified reports were based mainly on the direct testimonies of children who continue to be on active duty, either in Sana'a city or Abyan governorate, including two boys used by YAF as a cook and a servant, respectively, and children manning checkpoints.

25. While the number of reported and verified cases is limited, the recruitment and use of children by YAF is considered to be ongoing, mainly in Sana'a city, but also in Aden, Abyan, and Sa'ada governorates. In 2011, during the height of the civil unrest, armed children in uniforms were seen on a regular basis manning military checkpoints or protecting demonstrators in major cities, such as Sana'a and Taiz. In

2012, while fewer armed children were sighted at checkpoints or performing security duties, reports of incidents of recruitment and use of children increased with the expanded monitoring capacity of the United Nations.

26. Recruitment drives to increase the size of YAF, coupled with inadequate screening procedures and a general lack of socioeconomic options for children, have resulted in many children below the age of 18 years joining the army. Some children were attracted by the prospect of a regular salary; others joined the Republican Guard to support the President, or joined FAD to support the "revolution". Their recruitment was at times facilitated by brokers, such as military officers, family members in the army and local sheikhs (religious leaders) through, inter alia, the use of false birth certificates or identity cards.

27. Among the children interviewed, some feared potential reprisals by YAF if it found they had misrepresented their actual age. At the same time, children were widely expected to take on adult responsibilities at an early age, and boys were expected to carry firearms to protect their tribe or community.

28. Many boys confirmed the presence of other children in YAF, which could indicate that the issue is more widespread. Two children, who were verified not to be on active duty, continued to receive a monthly salary, attend military training and occasionally man checkpoints for YAF on weekends or during holidays.

Al-Houthi armed group

29. The United Nations and its partners continue to face challenges in monitoring and receiving reports of violations by the Al-Houthi armed group in general, and especially in gathering information related to the recruitment and use of children. This is due to a range of factors, including limited humanitarian space and access; the reluctance of family and community members to report such violations; and a culture of tolerance of children's involvement with Al-Houthi among family members and local non-governmental organizations based in areas controlled by the armed group. In addition, the children themselves do not consider their association with Al-Houthi to be a grave violation of their rights but rather an obligation to protect their land, themselves and their families. In 2011, however, the United Nations noted a drive to recruit individuals, including children, to man checkpoints in Sa'ada city or to fight against armed tribal groups in the neighbouring Al-Jawf governorate.

30. The Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting was able to verify four reports of child recruitment and use by Al-Houthi in Hajjah governorate, a Government-controlled area. All of the children were armed and were manning either checkpoints set up by the armed group or primary health centres used by it.

Pro-Government tribal militias

31. In pro-Government armed militias, reports were verified of three boys (aged 13, 16 and 17 years) who were recruited and used to guard checkpoints by the Popular Resistance Committee in Abyan governorate, which has supported Government military operations in the region.

Ansar al-Sharia

32. Reports were verified by the United Nations in Yemen of 21 children, all boys from Abyan governorate aged between 14 and 17 years, being recruited and used by Ansar al-Sharia. In 2011, reports of recruitment and use were somewhat limited as monitoring was impeded by restricted access to the areas, and because of fear among family and community members of reporting such violations. However, in 2012, owing to the improved monitoring capacity and access to Abyan, the number of verified reports of children being recruited and used by Ansar al-Sharia increased, comprising up to 30 per cent of total verified reports. Of the aforementioned 21 children, 2 boys died during combat, 3 were maimed, 2 returned to their homes and the rest continue to be associated with the group. Many boys joined the armed group based on promises of a better life and monetary rewards, coupled with Islamic ideologies which implied that they would go straight to heaven. Some were drugged, and three were recruited for purposes of sexual exploitation and abuse. Others were sent to Damaj, Sa'ada governorate, to fight against the Al-Houthi armed group; many fought against YAF in Abyan; and many worked as spies, guards and logisticians (buying and selling arms, as well as food and water).

B. Killing and maiming of children

33. During the reporting period, the United Nations in Yemen documented reports of 564 children, 135 of whom were reported killed (111 boys, 24 girls) and 429 were reported maimed (370 boys, 59 girls). Of these, 290 cases were verified, with 79 children (62 boys, 17 girls) killed and 210 (180 boys, 30 girls) maimed. The majority of unverified cases occurred between July and December 2011, when 274 children were reportedly either killed (49 boys, 7 girls) or maimed (190 boys, 28 girls). Verification of these cases was not possible given the aforementioned challenges to monitoring during that period.

34. The identification of the perpetrators responsible for the killing or maiming of children has been a challenge. The perpetrator in 53 per cent of the documented cases involving 157 children (131 boys, 26 girls) killed or maimed is unknown, mainly due to the high number of incidents related to mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. During the reporting period, 89 cases (72 boys, 17 girls) of killing or maiming of children by YAF (consisting of the Republican Guard, FAD, the Central Security Forces and the military police) were verified: 26 children (19 boys, 7 girls) were killed, and 63 children (53 boys, 10 girls) were maimed. In addition, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia were responsible for 13 children killed (10 boys, 3 girls) and 16 children (all boys) maimed; the Al-Hirak armed group was responsible for one boy killed and six children (5 boys, 1 girl) maimed; and the Al-Houthi armed group was responsible for the killing of two boys.

35. A total of 97 (86 boys, 11 girls) child casualties were attributed to various types of explosive weapons. In particular, children have been victims of death or injury due to mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war, including improvised explosive devices. Four children died as a result of suicide bombing attacks (three in Abyan and one in Al Bayda' governorate). The perpetrators remain unknown in 39 cases, while in 3 they are reportedly members of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia. Of the 97 child casualties, 23 boys and one

girl were killed, and 63 boys and 10 girls were maimed. The majority were due to incidents with unexploded ordnance, in which 71 children were either killed (13 boys, 1 girl) or maimed (50 boys, 7 girls). Of these, 65 per cent occurred in Abyan governorate and affected 46 children, with 8 children killed (all boys) and 38 maimed (36 boys, 2 girls). For example, on 1 July 2012, a 12-year-old boy showed to his friends a piece of military ordnance which exploded, injuring him and nine other boys. Another incident occurred in December 2012 when a piece of military ordnance brought home by two children exploded in their home, killing the 12-year-old boy and seriously injuring his 4-year-old brother. Incidents involving children and mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war have increased following the return of internally displaced persons to Abyan after June 2012, when the Government regained control of the area. Fifty-nine child casualties (54 boys, 5 girls) were documented during the period from July 2012 to March 2013, compared to 38 child casualties (32 boys, 6 girls) reported prior to July 2012.

36. A further 70 children (56 boys, 14 girls) were affected by gunshots, mainly during crossfire, which led to the killing of 17 children (13 boys, 4 girls) and the maiming of 53 (43 boys and 10 girls). Over one half of the incidents occurred in Aden (60 per cent), affecting 42 children (33 boys, 9 girls) of whom 8 (6 boys, 2 girls) were killed and 34 (27 boys, 7 girls) were maimed. For example, in June 2012, a 16-year-old boy was killed and three boys aged 13, 15 and 17 years were injured when the Central Security Forces opened fire on a funeral procession in which they were participating; the funeral was of a boy killed earlier by YAF. On 21 February 2013, during protests organized by the Al-Hirak movement in Aden around the first anniversary of the 2012 presidential election, three boys participating in the protests, aged 16 and 17 years, were maimed by the Central Security Forces. In addition, three children (one 12-year-old girl and two boys aged 16 and 14 years) were injured during indiscriminate shooting of demonstrators by the Central Security Forces.

37. A further 25 children were killed (6 boys, 1 girl) or maimed (15 boys, 3 girls) by indiscriminate shelling. For example, on 13 August 2011, three siblings were seriously injured when they took shelter next to their house during heavy shelling by the Republican Guard of their village in the Nihm district of Sana'a governorate, and four boys (aged 11 and 13 years) were maimed in Shabwa governorate when playing football on an empty area close to an alleged Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula hideout which was shelled by YAF.

38. Nineteen children (15 boys, 4 girls) were killed (1 boy) or maimed (14 boys, 4 girls) by shrapnel. For example, on 30 March 2012, five boys (aged 11, 12 and 13) who were playing by the road were injured by shrapnel from a bomb dropped during a YAF airstrike that hit a car belonging to supporters of Ansar al-Sharia in Shabwa governorate.

39. Twenty-four children were killed (6 boys, 6 girls) or maimed (12 boys) by air-dropped bombs. Of these, eight were verified to be victims of drone attacks which targeted Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia hideouts in Abyan, Shabwa and Al Bayda' and were responsible for the killing of six children (5 boys, 1 girl) and the maiming of eight (7 boys, 1 girl). Other incidents include the maiming of a 12-year-old boy who was severely injured by an air-dropped bomb while playing football outdoors in Khanfar district, Abyan governorate, on 29 June 2012.

40. Twelve children (10 boys, 2 girls) were either killed (2 boys) or maimed (8 boys, 2 girls) by bomb explosions. For example, on 29 February 2012, a 17-year-old boy who was shopping at the market was severely injured by a bomb explosion in Crater district in Aden. The perpetrators were unknown in all but one case. The said incident, perpetrated by a member of the Central Security Forces, caused the maiming of six children.

41. Eleven children (10 boys, 1 girl) were killed (1 boy) or maimed (9 boys, 1 girl) by grenade attacks. For example, on 26 September 2012, in Rusud district, Abyan governorate, a 40-year-old former Ansar al-Sharia member and qat seller pulled the pin of a grenade at a market, killing five people, including himself and one 7-year-old boy, and injuring six boys aged 4, 11, 15 and 17 years.

42. The remaining incidents involved seven boys killed or maimed by artillery fire and five children killed or maimed during mortar attacks. Two cases were attributed to YAF, one case to Ansar al-Sharia and one to an unknown perpetrator. One incident occurred on 29 October 2011 in Arhab district, Sana'a governorate, when artillery fired by a tank of the Republican Guard hit a group of children who were playing outdoors, killing three boys (aged 9, 14 and 17 years) and injuring three boys aged 12 years, as well as one 8-year-old. One mortar incident (perpetrator unknown) occurred on 12 April 2012 in Lawdar district, Abyan governorate, hitting an electricity station and injuring one boy who was walking nearby.

43. During the reporting period, 75 per cent of incidents involving 219 children (190 boys, 29 girls) occurred in the southern governorates of Abyan (111 boys, 11 girls), Aden (48 boys, 12 girls), Lahij (13 boys, 4 girls), Shabwa (15 boys, 1 girl) and Al Dahle (3 boys, 1 girl). The next greatest number occurred in the central and western governorates, where incidents involving 53 children were reported in Sana'a city and the governorates of Sana'a, Taiz, Hadramaut and Al Bayda'. Eighteen incidents involving 13 boys and 5 girls were reported from the northern governorates of Hajjah and Sa'ada.

C. Rape and other grave acts of sexual violence

44. The Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting has documented reports that up to 100 girls in Abyan were forcibly married to leaders or members of Ansar al-Sharia during the past year, when the armed group was controlling Abyan governorate. The United Nations was, however, able to verify only seven cases, involving seven girls between the ages of 13 and 17 years. A dowry as high as US\$ 5,000 was paid to some of the girls' families, whose average monthly income is about US\$ 12. In other cases, including two of those verified, the girls (aged 15 and 17 years) were offered as gifts by their brothers who had been allowed to join the armed groups. The majority of girls come from the districts of Yafe'a, Lawdar and Khanfar, Abyan governorate.

45. Many girls became pregnant following their marriage to members of the armed group. The girls and their families are reluctant to report abuses owing, among other reasons, to fear of reprisals by remnants of the armed group still present in Abyan. In each of the seven verified cases, the wives reported that they had been abandoned along with their children by the husbands who fled Abyan following the Government offensive.

46. While it is difficult to estimate the extent, reportedly boys are also increasingly being recruited by Ansar al-Sharia for purposes of sexual abuse and exploitation. Three boys were verified as having been recruited by Ansar al-Sharia after having been stigmatized in their communities for being sexually abused by men on regular basis. The boys have been used as spies and logisticians by the armed group, in addition to being repeatedly sexually exploited. Two of them have since left the armed group to return to their families and are receiving appropriate assistance for their recovery. It is highly likely that this phenomenon is underreported owing to the social stigma.

D. Abduction of children

47. Verified reports of cases of abduction of children by armed forces and armed groups are limited. During the reporting period, five reports of abduction were received, of which four (all involving boys) were verified. Of these, one involved an 8-year-old boy who was with his father, a cook in a military camp in Abyan. Both were abducted by Ansar al-Sharia when the armed group attacked the camp, killing some soldiers. The whereabouts of father and son are still unknown. Another boy was abducted by Al-Houthi and later found dead in the 'Ahim area on the way to Haradh, Hajjah governorate. The remaining two boys were siblings abducted by an unknown armed group in the district of Khawlan, Sana'a governorate.

E. Attacks on schools

48. In total, 242 attacks on schools were reported. All except three incidents were verified. These incidents occurred mainly in Sana'a city (94 attacks) and the governorates of Abyan (45 attacks) and Sana'a (88 attacks), but also in Aden, Hajjah, Hadramaut, Lahij, Sa'ada and Taiz governorates. The Ministry of Education, together with the education and child protection clusters of the United Nations country team, conducted rapid assessments of the attacks in Sana'a city and Sana'a and Taiz governorates, covering 348 schools during and after the civil unrest which took place between November 2011 and May 2012.

49. Attacks reported included 110 incidents of physical destruction of schools, including schools that were attacked by shelling, mainly in Sana'a city (52 attacks) during the height of the civil unrest when schools were caught up in the crossfire between YAF and armed opposition groups. Another 37 attacks took place in Sana'a governorate where schools were caught up in fighting between the Republican Guard and armed opposition tribal groups, and in the governorate of Abyan where 19 attacks were reported and verified. For example, in Abyan, during the offensive by YAF which began early in 2012 and continued until June, many schools were closed and occupied by Ansar al-Sharia for military use. This triggered the shelling in Abyan, allegedly by YAF, of at least 19 schools which were either partially or totally destroyed. Another incident occurred in Aden.

50. There were 79 verified reports of intimidation of and threats to students and teachers, caused mainly by sound bombs thrown at schools and gunshots that occurred in close proximity to them. The verified incidents took place mainly in Sana'a city (23 attacks) and the governorate of Sana'a (50), but also in Aden, Hadramaut, Hajjah, Lahij and Taiz governorates. For example, Rabi'ah Al-Adawiyah School in Sana'a

city is a girls' school that was located close to demonstrations. Many of the girls were too scared to attend school due to the gunfire heard nearby and because of bullets that landed in their schoolyard.

51. Two reports of attacks against teachers and students were verified: one in Taiz and one on 23 February 2013, when the Al-Houthi armed group stormed into Al-Emam Al-Hady School in Sa'ada governorate, demanding to keep one prisoner inside the school temporarily. When the school's management refused to allow the prisoner to enter the school premises, the group opened fire, injuring one teacher.

52. In total, 46 attacks were reported and verified in which schools were occupied and used for military purposes by armed forces and armed groups. The attacks took place mainly in the governorates of Abyan governorate (25 attacks) and Sana'a city (17), but also in Hajjah and Sana'a governorates. For example, Al Andalus School, a girls' school in Sana'a city, was partially occupied both inside and outside by FAD, which hindered the operation of the school as the female students feared the presence of the armed group. In Hajjah governorate, Shaata Al Barad School was closed in August 2012 by the Al-Houthi armed group which used it to store weapons.

53. The majority of incidents were verified through rapid assessments led by the Yemeni authorities. In a large number of incidents, the perpetrators were unknown (137) and the remaining are alleged reports, including 51 incidents attributed to YAF, 36 of them to FAD. The remaining incidents were attributed to Ansar al-Sharia (26), tribal armed groups (19), an armed Al-Islah group (11) and an Al-Houthi armed group (3).

F. Attacks on hospitals

54. Eighteen attacks on hospitals were reported, 17 of which were verified. Nine of these occurred in Hajjah, three in Taiz, two in Aden, one in Abyan, one in Sana'a city and one in Hadramaut.

55. The attacks included four physical attacks on hospitals by shelling and aerial bombardment in Taiz, Abyan and Sana'a city. Al-Jumhuriyya Hospital in Sana'a city was partially destroyed on 19 September 2011; on the same day, two medical personnel were killed in Change Square in Sana'a while they were reportedly assisting injured demonstrators. In Abyan, Al-Razi Hospital was partially destroyed by aerial bombardment by YAF on 5 September 2011, an incident which resulted in the maiming of two children. In Taiz, two physical attacks on hospitals, in October and December 2011, respectively, were verified. One was on Al-Thawrah Hospital, which had been occupied by the Republican Guard since early October. The hospital was being used as a base for military operations while patients were being treated; it was subsequently attacked on 3 December 2011, allegedly by armed opposition groups.

56. In Hajjah, the Al-Houthi armed group was responsible for all of nine attacks, including one incident of intimidation of health personnel and eight of military use and/or occupation by the armed group. These attacks resulted in the closure of eight health centres, including two supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) which served as outpatient therapeutic care centres, providing nutritional

interventions for malnourished children. The closure of these centres affected some 5,000 children in the area.

57. Two attacks against medical personnel in Aden and one in Hadramaut were caused by the Central Security Forces which forcibly entered the hospitals in search of patients. In Aden, health personnel were intimidated by random shooting by the Central Security Forces upon entering the hospital; this incident resulted in the death of one boy who was selling fruit in front of the hospital and who was caught in the crossfire.

G. Denial of humanitarian access to children

58. During the reporting period, 46 incidents of denial of humanitarian access were verified by the United Nations in Yemen, of which 23 related to hijacking of vehicles of the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations. For example, on 16 December 2012, one truck of a non-governmental organization transporting UNICEF water and sanitation supplies was hijacked by armed tribal groups at an illegal checkpoint in Hajjah governorate.

59. Another seven verified incidents of abduction of humanitarian personnel occurred between November 2011 and April 2012 in Sana'a city and Amran, Hodeidah, Lahij, Al-Mahwit, Marib and Sa'ada governorates, involving a total of 19 personnel. One of the incidents involved the abduction of five international staff and two national staff by an armed tribal group; the humanitarian personnel were safely released several days later.

60. Eleven reports of threats or arrests and intimidation against staff members of the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations were documented and verified. One resulted in the evacuation of an international staff member, while another involved the arrest of United Nations staff and their vehicle by Government armed forces.

61. During the reporting period, there were five verified incidents of impeded humanitarian access which prevented safe and unhindered access to the governorates of Abyan and Sa'ada. The governorate of Abyan was inaccessible from the beginning of the reporting period until June 2012, when YAF regained control of the governorate following an intensive offensive against Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and Ansar al-Sharia. Furthermore, while internally displaced persons have been returning to Abyan since June 2012, the ongoing presence of mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants of war, booby traps and improvised explosive devices poses a significant threat, affecting both the population's access to basic social services and the full and safe access by humanitarian agencies for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to high-risk areas, such as in and around Zinjibar district.

62. In the governorate of Sa'ada, Al-Houthi imposed a siege on the village of Damaj, which lasted from mid-October to end-December 2011. The fighting caused disruption in the provision of basic social services, severely affecting the 12,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, challenges were posed by Al-Houthi, which placed conditions on the humanitarian assistance, such as restrictions on recruitment of staff, mandatory hiring of government personnel, and restrictions on the movement of personnel and supplies within Sa'ada. The restrictions resulted in the

diminishment of humanitarian space for many organizations; as a result, some humanitarian agencies have now completely withdrawn from Sa'ada governorate.

IV. Dialogue and action plans

63. Concrete progress was made in 2012 in engaging the listed parties in dialogue, with a view to the preparation and implementation of action plans, in line with Security Council resolutions 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011), on children and armed conflict.

64. My Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict visited Yemen in November 2012 and met with President Hadi and other members of the Government, as well as key political and military actors, including the leadership of the Al-Houthi armed group, FAD and tribal groups. My Special Representative obtained commitments from the Yemeni Government to develop a concrete and time-bound action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in YAF, and from Al-Houthi to continue the dialogue with the United Nations on this matter. During her visit, a presidential decree banning the recruitment and use of children under the age of 18 years was issued; the Government endorsed the Paris Commitments on the association of children with armed forces and armed groups; and the Government agreed to establish an interministerial committee on 1 January 2013 to serve as the main institutional forum for the development of an action plan with the Government of Yemen to address the recruitment and use of children in the Yemeni Armed Forces. On the same day, the Minister of Legal Affairs was appointed to head the interministerial committee, which comprises the Minister of Human Rights, Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior. The committee receives the technical support of UNICEF. A technical working group of the committee was formed in February 2013 and has met several times to prepare a draft of the action plan, which remained pending at the end of May 2013.

65. The fruitful visit of my Special Representative and her engagement with the leader of the Al-Houthi armed group, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, in November 2012, led to an agreement to initiate dialogue with the United Nations in Yemen and the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting with a view to the release and reintegration of children associated with the armed group.

66. Progress was also made in 2012 towards the adoption and implementation of national legislation prohibiting child recruitment and other grave child rights violations. With United Nations support, a national reform committee prepared a legislative policy document on child recruitment, reviewing the existing gaps in legislation, policies and procedures and making recommendations for harmonization with international legal standards. Five relevant military laws were reviewed and amendments were suggested, including the prohibition of voluntary recruitment of children under 18 years of age, stricter penalties for those who recruit children, and a proposal towards systematic and unified recruitment mechanisms. These amendments are to be endorsed by the Cabinet and further ratified by Parliament in 2013.

67. In addition, on 18 April 2012, the Minister of Interior addressed a letter to the police and other relevant State authorities ordering the full implementation of Police Commission Law No. 15 of 2000, which stipulates that the age of new recruits

should be above 18 years, and that those younger than 18 years must be released immediately.

V. Advocacy, protection response and follow-up to recommendations of the Secretary-General and the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

68. Systematic monitoring and reporting of grave child rights violations began in Yemen in 2011 and was formalized in October 2012 with the establishment of the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting. Efforts have been made to promote shared responsibility among United Nations agencies, including through capacity-building of over 80 field monitors and staff, standardization of tools and information-sharing among key stakeholders. This has been channelled through and facilitated by, in part, the child protection sub-cluster and the education cluster. For example, joint assessments of schools were carried out by the child protection sub-cluster, the education cluster and the Ministry of Education in Sana'a city and were further extended to Taiz and Sana'a governorates.

69. The above-mentioned polarization of national and local non-governmental organizations in the wake of political and tribal tensions required additional vigilance in verifying the neutrality and impartiality of reported incidents of grave child rights violations. The limited technical capacity of local non-governmental organizations to undertake this work also required extensive training, coaching and mentoring.

70. In addition to the monitoring of grave child rights violations, a number of advocacy and programmatic protection responses were carried out by the United Nations during the reporting period, as described below.

Advocacy efforts

71. Significant advocacy efforts to end grave child rights violations in Yemen have been carried out by various parts of the United Nations system, as well as by interested Member States. Given the persistent widespread unrest, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in June 2011 conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen and collected information on grave child rights violations. The Human Rights Council, in September 2011, adopted the recommendations contained in the High Commissioner's mission report (A/HRC/18/21), which called specifically on the Government of Yemen to end the recruitment and use of children. In July 2012, OHCHR conducted a follow-up mission and noted the continued recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups, the killing and maiming of children, and the increased number of child victims of mines and unexploded ordnance-related incidents, as well as attacks on schools. The findings of that report were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in September 2012.

72. My Special Adviser on Yemen also visited Yemen on numerous occasions during the reporting period and, in his briefings to the Security Council, highlighted the alarming trends in the recruitment and use of children, as well as the pervasive

risk of mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war for civilians, especially children.

73. As mentioned above, the visit to Yemen of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in November 2012 led to significant new momentum and commitments by the Government of Yemen and the Al-Houthi armed group to address grave child rights violations.

74. These efforts were reinforced by the visit of the Security Council delegation to Yemen on 27 January 2013 and by the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 15 February (S/PRST/2013/3), in which the Council urged the need to respect the rule of law and protect human rights, in accordance with Yemen's international legal obligations, particularly those of women and people belonging to vulnerable groups, such as children. In that regard, the Council welcomed the commitment by the Government to end the recruitment and use of children by the Yemeni security forces through the adoption and implementation of an action plan in line with Council resolution 1612 (2005).

Psychosocial support

75. The child protection sub-cluster, under the leadership of UNICEF and in partnership with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and civil society organizations, has provided psychosocial assistance to 498,387 children at schools and in community-based, child-friendly spaces. Of these children, 13,389 were identified as highly vulnerable children, such as survivors of sexual violence, trafficked children, unaccompanied children or children otherwise separated from their families, and received specialized assistance and referrals, including legal aid. In the conflict-affected governorates of Aden, Abyan, Hajjah, Lahij, Sa'ada, Sana'a and Taiz, approximately 6,126 teachers were trained and equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to provide child-centred teaching and psychosocial support to affected children.

Mines and unexploded ordnance

76. Together with the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre, UNICEF and other partners have undertaken an accelerated mine risk education programme which has reached 133,594 adults and 126,502 children in the conflict-affected areas of Abyan, Aden, Hajjah, Lahij and Sa'ada governorates since mid-2011. A special fund for victims was allocated to UNICEF and its partners and was used to support 31 vulnerable child victims of mines and unexploded ordnance by covering the high costs of medical care and transportation. To ensure a systematic response to the problem of mines and unexploded ordnance, a strategy for the national mine action programme was developed by the Government of Yemen in January 2013 and adopted in February.

Support to education

77. The education cluster, led by UNICEF and Save the Children, supported the Ministry of Education in conducting a nationwide back-to-school campaign to encourage and facilitate access to schools and to reduce the number of school dropouts in 2011 and 2012, especially among children affected by conflict. Through the campaign, 276 tents for temporary schools were provided in Aden, Hodeidah and Sa'ada, and essential learning materials and school kits were provided to

1,550,000 internally displaced and other vulnerable children. In addition, 60,000 brochures and 30,000 posters were distributed among affected communities to raise awareness about the value of education and the importance of sending children back to school.

78. In 2012, UNICEF rehabilitated 57 schools in Aden and Lahij, which had been occupied by internally displaced persons, and rehabilitated a further 19 schools in Abyan following the return of displaced persons to Abyan governorate. In 2013, plans are under way by the education cluster to rehabilitate 142 schools affected by the conflict in Abyan, Aden, Lahij, Sa'ada and Sana'a, through a grant by a global initiative concerned with education in developing countries, the Global Partnership for Education.

VI. Recommendations

79. I welcome the commitment and efforts made by the Government of Yemen following the visit of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in November 2012 and the visit of the Security Council on 27 January 2013. I strongly encourage the Government to accelerate its efforts to follow up these commitments and finalize an action plan to address the recruitment and use of children by Government forces, in line with Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011), and to ratify the proposed amendments to five relevant military laws and allocate adequate resources for their effective implementation. The United Nations stands ready to provide technical support in this regard as required.

80. I welcome the progress made by the Government, in particular the Military Affairs Committee, to accelerate the restructuring of the military and establish appropriate age verification procedures at recruitment centres and the screening of all underage recruits. I call on the Government to ensure screening of the recently dismantled FAD and the Republican Guard, listed in annex I to my annual report (A/67/845-S/2013/245), in order to ensure that no children are integrated into the army.

81. I call upon all parties to the conflict to comply with international law and to respect and uphold the neutrality and safety of schools and hospitals as zones of peace, including the safety of their personnel.

82. I welcome the commitment expressed by the Al-Houthi armed group during the visit of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to engage with the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and to continue to cooperate with it in developing an action plan to end recruitment and use of children and other grave violations, in line with Security Council resolutions 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011). I welcome the initial efforts made in this regard, and call upon the Al-Houthi leadership to advance its dialogue with the United Nations.

83. I welcome the Government's efforts in convening the National Dialogue Conference, with the support of my Special Adviser on Yemen, which was launched on 18 March 2013 to foster unity and reconciliation. I encourage all stakeholders to consider children's issues and needs in the context of the Conference. I urge the Government to prioritize the development of sustainable livelihood opportunities for

youth, including through vocational training and employment, in order to positively empower them and prevent their involvement in armed violence. I also invite the donor and humanitarian community to provide additional support to such national programmes and initiatives, together with specialized agencies, to ensure that they are adequately resourced.

84. I am deeply concerned that children are at high risk of being killed and maimed by mines, unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war, as well as by suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices and drone strikes. I condemn in the strongest possible terms the grave violations of children's rights by the use of such weapons, and call upon all stakeholders to prevent such attacks and take steps to reduce their impact on children.

85. I welcome the Government of Yemen's recently signed project for the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre, which, in accordance with international standards, will renew and expand its mine action programme with robust strategies to effectively address the mixed contamination of explosive devices in civilian areas and the proliferation of unconventional explosive devices. I urge the Government to prioritize the revision and expansion of survivor assistance programmes, including child-friendly programmes, given the increased incidence of child victims of mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. I further call upon the donor community to ensure that the renewed mine action programme is adequately resourced.

**Security Council**

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**Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the
United Nations Office for West Africa****I. Introduction**

1. In a letter dated 20 December 2010 (S/2010/661), the President of the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2013 and requested me to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the revised mandate of the Office.
2. The present report covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2013. It provides an overview of national, cross-cutting and cross-border developments in West Africa and outlines the activities undertaken by UNOWA in the areas of preventive diplomacy, early warning and capacity-building to address emerging threats and challenges to regional peace and stability. It also outlines the efforts of the Office to enhance synergies with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Mano River Union and the African Union in the promotion of peace and stability in the subregion.

II. Developments and trends in West Africa**A. Political trends**

3. Since the issuance of my previous report, dated 31 December 2012 (S/2012/977), the political landscape in West Africa has continued to be dominated by the consequences of the crises in Mali and the Sahel, the election-related tensions in a number of countries and the incomplete transition in Guinea-Bissau. In Mali, with the start of the French-led military operations in January, ECOWAS member States mobilized and deployed troops under the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to provide support to the Malian defence and security forces for the restoration of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. The military operations in Mali highlighted the need for enhanced regional cooperation on security and for more robust domestic measures to prevent the infiltration of terrorist groups from neighbouring countries. In this respect, a number of initiatives were taken at the subregional level, notably the adoption of a counter-terrorism strategy by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS at its forty-second ordinary session, held in Yamoussoukro on 27 and 28 February



2013. Meanwhile, the Security Council adopted resolution 2100 (2013), by which it established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and transferred the authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July. Apart from the security concerns, the United Nations will focus primarily on the dialogue and reconciliation process and the establishment of conditions conducive to the holding of elections.

5. Despite the progress made towards building democratic and effective institutions in the subregion, several countries continued to face election-related tensions. In Guinea, Mauritania and Togo, divergences persisted between the Government and opposition parties regarding the holding of legislative elections. In Guinea and Togo, the tensions have escalated into violent demonstrations, resulting in the loss of lives and damage to property. In Côte d'Ivoire, local elections held on 21 April were boycotted by the former ruling party, the Front populaire ivoirien, which resulted in some localized incidents of violence. In the Gambia, reforms to ensure free and fair elections were not implemented prior to the local polls, leading the opposition parties to withdraw from participating.

6. In spite of these challenges, the subregion witnessed positive developments in the area of regional cooperation and integration. In February, the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea committed themselves to resolving the long-standing dispute over the border village of Kpéaba through peaceful means by withdrawing their respective armed forces from the area and establishing a joint demarcation commission. Likewise, the border dispute between the Niger and Burkina Faso was resolved by an International Court of Justice Judgment of 16 April 2013, which redefined the border to their mutual satisfaction.

B. Security trends, including terrorism, maritime security, drug trafficking and organized crime

7. Three geographical areas remain considerable sources of instability in West Africa, namely, the Mano River basin, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. In the Mano River basin, the situation remains generally volatile, mainly owing to growing income inequalities and the attendant social tensions, youth unemployment, environmental degradation, and weak security and justice sectors, as well as incomplete processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. These domestic challenges to stability are compounded by the existence of porous national borders, which facilitate the unhindered cross-border movement of weapons and criminal groups. In the Gulf of Guinea, cross-border threats have taken on a new dimension as a result of piracy and other forms of organized crime. The crisis in Mali and the fragility in the Sahel continue to affect the other countries of West Africa, while exposing the interconnectedness of transnational threats in the subregion.

8. Moreover, violent religious extremism and terrorism seem to be spreading throughout West Africa and beyond. This was illustrated by the hostage crisis in the Tigantourine gas plant near In Amenas, Algeria, on 16 January and the kidnapping of a French family in Cameroon on 19 February. In addition, in the Niger on 23 May, two attacks claimed by the Movement for Jihad and Unity in West Africa targeted a military barracks in the northern city of Agadez, and a uranium plant in Arlit in the north-central part of the country. In turn, the militant group Boko Haram

has expanded its activities beyond the territory of Nigeria, thus becoming a threat to stability in the entire region. As a result of the increasing level of violence in the north-eastern region of the country, the President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, on 14 May declared a state of emergency in the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Subsequently, on 15 May, the Nigerian military was deployed in large numbers to these states to combat Boko Haram. On 4 June, the Nigerian Government officially declared the group and its suspected off-shoot, known as Ansaru, as "illegal and terrorist" and issued a law banning them.

9. The limitations of regional capacities to build collective security mechanisms in West Africa have been exposed by the inadequate response to the crisis in Mali, as well as the inability of Sahelian States to enhance border control and fight terrorism. The crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau have also highlighted the challenges posed by weak security sector institutions and the threat of transnational organized crime in West Africa. Notwithstanding some progress made in regard to security sector reform initiatives in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, the ECOWAS draft political framework and plan of action on security sector governance is yet to be finalized.

10. Drug seizures in the subregion have confirmed that West Africa remains a transit point for illicit drug trafficking. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 127 kilograms of heroin were apprehended in January at the Port of Cotonou, Benin; 282 kilograms of cocaine were seized in February at the port of Tema, Ghana; 168 kilograms of cocaine departing from Senegal were seized in March in waters of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and in Togo, 14 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized at Lomé international airport. On 23 March, a ship carrying two tons of cocaine from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was intercepted at sea, 700 miles south-west of Cape Verde. In April, Mauritanian security forces seized, at the Algerian border, about one ton of various illicit drugs arriving from northern Mali, confirming the continuous use of the Saharan route. Counterfeit medicine trafficking, methamphetamine production and drug abuse are also increasing concerns in the subregion.

11. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea remains a threat to the security and economic activities of the affected countries. Between 1 January and 29 May, 29 attempted or committed acts of piracy and armed robbery in West African waters were reported to the International Maritime Organization, compared with 30 in 2012. Of the reported 29 incidents, 4 involved the hijacking of ships which were subsequently released. Furthermore, a casualty was reported on 4 February, when a tanker was fired upon while at anchorage in Lagos, resulting in the death of one crew member. A summit of Heads of State was held in Cameroon on 24 and 25 June, as requested by the Security Council in resolution 2039 (2012). The summit adopted the Code of Conduct concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa, which defines the regional strategy and paves the way for a legally binding instrument. Meanwhile, the validation process of an ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy and integrated implementation plan continues through consultations with independent experts, civil society organizations and media.

12. There was a reduced number of cross-border attacks along the border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire as a result of the continued efforts of the Governments of

Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, with the support of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). However, the situation remained tense owing to the reported presence of mercenaries, former combatants and other armed elements, as well as the uncontrolled circulation of weapons.

C. Economic, social and humanitarian trends

13. According to ECOWAS, in the first half of 2013, economic growth for West Africa was approximately 7 per cent, compared with 4.5 per cent for the whole continent, while inflation stood at around 7.3 per cent throughout the subregion. The countries that registered the highest growth, namely, Liberia at 8.3 per cent, Sierra Leone at 19.7 per cent and Côte d'Ivoire at 9.8 per cent, belong to the most prosperous yet politically fragile region of the Mano River basin. During the reporting period, ECOWAS continued its efforts to achieve economic and monetary integration by 2020, launching a programme aimed at developing infrastructure, investing in agriculture and promoting youth employment.

14. Despite a strong economic performance, West Africa continues to be affected by high levels of poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, high rates of youth unemployment and recurrent natural disasters. Likewise, the persistence of high food and fuel prices continues to have an impact on the living conditions of large segments of the population. Human development indicators in some of the countries are among the lowest in the world.

15. The humanitarian situation in West Africa continued to be dominated by the food insecurity and malnutrition crisis in the Sahel and displacement resulting from the conflict in Mali and the security situation in north-eastern Nigeria. Across the Sahel, an estimated 11.4 million people remain food insecure and are in need of assistance. In some regions of Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, children under 5 years of age suffer from global acute malnutrition that is above the emergency threshold. With the exception of Nigeria, which accounts for 50 per cent of the cereal production of the region, countries in the Sahel experienced a good 2012/13 harvest. However, chronic vulnerability, high food prices and access constraints continue to undermine the ability of populations to recover from the 2012 drought, and their resilience to withstand future shocks is limited.

16. Insecurity across West Africa is also affecting the humanitarian situation. In Nigeria, the National Emergency Management Agency reported that, as of end-April 2013, the population displaced owing to inter-communal conflict and insecurity had risen to 32,000, with at least 1,100 fatalities. In Yobe State, the killing by suspected Boko Haram elements of 10 health workers conducting a polio vaccination campaign on 9 February and of three doctors from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea two days later was a setback to efforts to eradicate polio in the country, where more than one half of the global polio cases have been recorded.

17. In Côte d'Ivoire, the overall humanitarian situation continued to progressively improve, although 45,000 internally displaced people still remain in the country, while 81,000 have found refuge in neighbouring countries. Despite a wave of returns in the first quarter of 2013 under the voluntary repatriation operations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, insecurity in the

west of the country has hampered sustainable returns. In March, new attacks by armed men in areas along the Liberian border triggered temporary displacements of between 7,000 and 8,000 people, while in May, more than 450 people fled to Liberia. Since the beginning of the crisis in Mali, instability in the north of the country has resulted in the total displacement of 475,000 people, including 174,000 who sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Since January, an estimated 60,000 people have been displaced from their homes, while an additional 10,000 people have been displaced in two sites in the region of Kidal.

D. Trends relating to good governance, rule of law and human rights

18. Efforts towards promoting and protecting human rights in West Africa have been hampered by the political instability, election-related tensions, intercommunal violence and the growing threat of terrorism. A number of alleged incidents of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances have yet to be fully investigated. In other instances in which prosecutions are under way, progress remains slow. Nonetheless, some positive steps have been taken by a number of West African countries to foster a culture of good governance and rule of law. Much remains to be done in building the capacity of State institutions in the region to address impunity, as called for in the Bamako Declaration adopted by the Regional Conference on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights in West Africa, organized under the auspices of UNOWA and held in Bamako from 2 to 4 December 2011.

19. Meanwhile, civil society in West Africa, in particular women's organizations, remained engaged to defuse tensions, promote a culture of good governance and prevent conflicts at the local level. Efforts to strengthen coordination among women's networks in the subregion continued through the efforts of the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in West Africa, established by UNOWA and the United Nations Development Fund for Women in 2009.

III. Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

A. United Nations good offices and activities in the areas of peace consolidation and conflict prevention

20. During the period under review, UNOWA continued to provide the Organization's good offices, focusing on the consolidation of democratic processes and institutions throughout the region and, in particular, on addressing election-related tensions in Guinea and the return to constitutional order in Mali.

Mali and the Sahel

21. My Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, continued to work closely with the organizations of the United Nations system, as well as with Malian, regional and international stakeholders, in providing support for the implementation of the strategic concept for Mali, adopted at the meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, held in Bamako on 19 October 2012. UNOWA also continued to engage in the development of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel (see S/2013/354), in close collaboration with my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, the United Nations Development Group

regional team in Dakar and the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator. In Mali, prior to the resumption of hostilities in January, my Special Representative supported the efforts of the ECOWAS mediation team to prepare for negotiations with groups in the north.

22. With the resumption of hostilities, and in support of the efforts of the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) and subsequently of MINUSMA, my Special Representative consulted with various stakeholders on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2085 (2012), as well as options for engaging with non-terrorist groups and other representatives of the northern populations to achieve a lasting solution to the crisis. Specifically, he held discussions on various occasions with the Malian transitional authorities in Bamako; the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, in his capacity as the ECOWAS Mediator for Mali; the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo; and a number of Heads of State and Government in the region. He also led the United Nations delegations to the sessions of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council and the ECOWAS summit of Heads of State and Government, and participated in the United Nations high-level delegations to the meetings of the Follow-up and Support Group on Mali held in Brussels on 5 February and in Bamako on 19 April. Throughout the reporting period, he has collaborated closely with the ECOWAS Commission, the Heads of UNOM, AFISMA and, subsequently, MINUSMA, to promote political dialogue and the implementation of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013).

23. Meanwhile, in the context of the development of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, my Special Representative and my Special Envoy for the Sahel jointly visited Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and the Niger from 13 to 15 February. They met with Heads of State, Government officials, civil society leaders and the United Nations country teams to discuss the challenges facing the region and the required areas of intervention to address the underlying causes of fragility. In Niamey, they attended the International Seminar on Security and Development in the Sahel-Sahara, organized by the Government of the Niger, the International Peace Institute and the Centre for Security Strategies for the Sahel-Sahara.

Guinea

24. Over the past six months, the political situation in Guinea has evolved positively. Between January and mid-March, deep divisions and mistrust between the Government and the opposition generated considerable political tensions, a climate of social instability and violent incidents, particularly in Conakry. The disagreements centred on three key issues related to the long-delayed legislative elections; the choice of Waymark InfoTech, a South African company, as the technical operator for the elections; the President's selection of the head of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), strongly contested by the opposition leaders; and the participation of Guinean citizens of the diaspora in the forthcoming elections. Furthermore, each side blamed the other for the violence and heavy loss of life and damage to property in Conakry. This had led opposition leaders to call for international mediation, to which the Presidential camp was vehemently opposed.

25. As members of the Security Council are aware, since the outbreak of the crisis I have offered the good offices of the United Nations in Guinea through my Special

Representative for West Africa. In this connection, my Special Representative paid numerous visits to Conakry, offering advice and encouraging both sides to engage in constructive dialogue, while at the same time building a strong partnership with interested regional leaders and key members of the international community represented in the country. Thus, by the end of March, despite continuing disagreements, the President of Guinea, Alpha Condé, and the main opposition leaders, Cellou Dalein Diallo, Sidya Touré and Lansana Kouyaté, had agreed to discuss their differences regarding the organization of legislative elections. At the suggestion of my Special Representative for West Africa, President Condé and Mr. Diallo had their first face-to-face meeting since April 2012 in the presence of President of Senegal, Macky Sall, in Nouakchott on 24 and 25 March. They both expressed their willingness to seek a compromise for the sake of the country.

26. Subsequently, the parties agreed to engage in structured discussions on the organization of legislative elections with the help of a team of facilitators. At the request of the parties, I appointed my Special Representative to serve on this team on 12 April. The team of facilitators has helped the Guinean parties to manage their intense mutual distrust and overcome their initial reluctance to negotiate. On 24 April, the parties signed an anti-violence declaration, which has helped to significantly reduce political tensions.

27. The dialogue is chaired by the Foreign Minister of Guinea and attended by representatives of the Guinean Government, the opposition parties, France and the United States of America, the International Organization of la Francophonie (OIF), the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Guinea. Its agenda includes: (a) issues related to the technical operator and the electoral register; (b) the functioning of CENI; (c) the vote of Guineans living abroad; and (d) the electoral timeline.

28. The parties have made significant progress on all agenda items. They have agreed that Guinean citizens living in 17 countries can participate in the elections, they have reached a compromise on modalities to improve the functioning and transparency of CENI and they have agreed on a series of measures to enhance the transparency and fairness of the electoral process. On 13 June, the President of CENI communicated to my Special Representative for West Africa and his co-facilitators a revised electoral timetable which sets 28 July as the date for the elections, establishes 18 June as the deadline for the submission of candidatures for the legislative elections and reopens voter registration for the six-day period from 18 to 24 June. Although the revised timetable was presented by the CENI leadership as the result of a consensus among its 24 commissioners, some members of CENI, echoed by the opposition parties, pointed to some incoherence in the revised timetable. They suggested that further consultations be held with the parties, under the auspices of the team of facilitators, to reach a suitable compromise on new dates for the elections, taking into consideration all financial and technical constraints related to the polls. Meanwhile, the parties were encouraged to continue to show flexibility and willingness to compromise in discussions on the remaining issues, including the electoral timetable. Clearly, these gains are fragile and can easily be reversed. As the present report was being finalized, my Special Representative was preparing to undertake his ninth visit to Conakry to resume his consultations with the Guinean parties.

29. The complex and delicate problems confronting Guinea are far from being resolved; however, the shift from a confrontational stance on both sides to a constructive engagement in dialogue bodes well for addressing the outstanding issues. The progress we are witnessing is a tribute to the remarkable skills of my Special Representative and his co-facilitators. The support they received from the United Nations country team and the multifaceted assistance offered by the representatives of the European Union, OIF, France and the United States in Conakry contributed in no small way to the progress made so far.

Gambia

30. From 11 to 15 February, UNOWA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) dispatched a joint early warning mission to the Gambia to assess the political and human rights situation, to follow up on a number of human rights issues and to explore new avenues of cooperation with the United Nations country team. During the visit, it was observed that the country continued to be confronted with political and human rights challenges, as illustrated by the opposition's decision to boycott the local elections on 4 April. In its findings, the mission noted that there was a need for the Government to address prevailing tensions relating to human rights, as well as electoral and judicial processes. The release of human rights activist Imam Baba Leigh on 16 May was a positive step in that direction.

Togo

31. Political tensions persisted in Togo as preparations for the legislative elections, scheduled to be held on 21 July, continued in parallel with efforts to resume the political dialogue, which have thus far failed to persuade the opposition to fully join the electoral process. The situation was further complicated when two fire incidents, which destroyed the markets of Kara and Lomé on 9 and 11 January, respectively, led to the arrest of some 24 people, including representatives of opposition political parties, youth groups and civil society organizations. Meanwhile, efforts to foster political dialogue between the Government and the opposition have been spearheaded by a group of ambassadors in Lomé and the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Togo. Against this background, UNOWA dispatched an early warning mission to Lomé from 25 February to 1 March. The mission noted the need for high-level subregional involvement in support of national efforts to facilitate dialogue among the concerned Togolese stakeholders. Meanwhile, the biometric voter registration was completed on 30 April and, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission, more than 3.1 million voters have been registered. However, the opposition denounced the registration process and called for an audit of the electoral list. Building on his engagement in the country in 2012, my Special Representative confirmed to the Togolese authorities his readiness to extend his good offices. He continues to remain in contact with the United Nations Resident Coordinator to monitor the situation and will visit Togo prior to the legislative elections. The Independent National Electoral Commission decided to extend the deadline for the submission of candidatures from 16 to 19 June 2013. Subsequently, this decision was praised by the opposition, who submitted its candidatures by the 19 June deadline. The Government has expressed its commitment to convening a political dialogue with all parties immediately after the elections.

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

32. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, chaired by my Special Representative, continued to make progress towards the implementation of the International Court of Justice ruling of 10 October 2002 on the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. During the thirty-first session of the Mixed Commission, held in Yaoundé on 25 and 26 April, the delegations of Cameroon and Nigeria endorsed the outcome of the successful field assessment mission to the Godel Mountains, one of the most inaccessible areas of the land boundary. The parties have so far agreed on 1,893 kilometres of the estimated 2,100-kilometre land boundary. After completion of the remaining distance, final maps of the international boundary will be prepared for validation and signature by the parties. These maps will be part of a boundary agreement, the form of which remains to be agreed upon. The Mixed Commission has further agreed to resume the construction of the boundary pillars, which has been interrupted since 2011. Under the new process, 323 of the remaining 920 boundary pillars will be constructed in the southern part of the land boundary by the end of 2013.

33. The Follow-up Committee established to monitor the implementation of the Greentree Agreement held its twenty-first and twenty-second meetings in Geneva, on 27 and 28 March and on 27 and 28 May, respectively, under the chairmanship of my Special Representative, with the participation of the representatives of Cameroon and Nigeria and the four witness States to the Agreement. The Committee reviewed the reports of the United Nations observers deployed to Bakassi and noted that, except for acts of banditry at sea, overall peace and tranquillity prevailed in the area. The Committee also noted the adherence of both parties to the Greentree Agreement, as well as the cordial relationship between the population and the Cameroonian security forces.

34. During the reporting period, the European Union, which funded demarcation activities from 2006 to 2010, carried out an independent evaluation of the assistance it provided. Highlighting the genuine ownership of the parties, the evaluation noted the positive impact of the process towards reaching a sustainable settlement of the boundary dispute. The review recommended, *inter alia*, a further contribution for the completion of construction of the boundary pillars, along with accompanying measures to minimize the risk of future disagreements and conflicts.

35. With regard to confidence-building measures, my Special Representative launched a funding appeal for the socioeconomic programme of the Mixed Commission which focuses on development projects for the border communities. In this connection, the European Union has expressed its commitment to continue to provide funding from the eleventh European Development Fund (2014-2020), while the World Bank has expressed its commitment to promote confidence-building projects for the populations affected by the demarcation.

B. Enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, including piracy

Security sector reform

36. Since my previous report, UNOWA has continued to provide support for the development of security sector reform capacities and of nationally led initiatives in

the subregion, in cooperation with key partners, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the Peacebuilding Support Office. At the subregional level, my Special Representative discussed the draft ECOWAS political framework and plan of action on security sector governance and reform with the President of the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, on 14 January. On 14 June in Dakar, UNOWA and ECOWAS discussed ways in which the United Nations could support that process.

37. Under the supervision of my Special Representative and in cooperation with the United Nations Resident Coordinator, the United Nations security sector reform advisory team provided the Guinean leadership with strategic advice and support in the reorganization of the supervisory and follow-up structures governing the national security sector reform process, with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund.

38. On 16 January, the Strategic Orientation Commission, which is the highest body of the National Steering Committee for Security Sector Reform and chaired by President Condé, outlined the national vision on defence and security. During the meeting, the five Ministries concerned, the Ministries of Defence, Security and Civil Protection, Justice, Finance and Environment, affirmed their commitment to complete their legal framework, finalize their sector-based policies and include security sector reform-related activities in their respective budgets for 2013. In this regard, the first Guinean laws regulating the special status of the police and civilian protection forces were approved by the President on 16 January, consistent with the recommendations contained in the report on an assessment of the security sector, conducted jointly by ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations and presented in May 2010. Following the approval of the judiciary act by the National Transition Council on 17 May, the constitutionality of the act will be examined by the Supreme Court prior to its promulgation.

39. In support of the national vision on defence and security, the security sector reform advisory team convened two workshops, on 5 and 6 March and from 8 to 12 April, to finalize the sectoral policies of the five Ministries concerned, which were subsequently validated in May. Moreover, the team provided support for the work of the Special Adviser to the Guinean President on the reform of the justice sector, particularly in relation to preparations for the presidential decree of 20 March, which established the National Steering Committee for Justice Sector Reform.

Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime

40. At its forty-second ordinary session, held in Yamoussoukro on 27 and 28 February, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government reaffirmed its commitment to the Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa and the 2008-2011 Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa, and decided to extend the Regional Action Plan for an additional two years. Together with UNODC, UNOWA will provide support for the ECOWAS-led revision exercise during the course of 2013-2014.

41. Meanwhile, the first meeting of the Network of West African Central Authorities and Prosecutors was held in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, from 28 to 30 May, pursuant to the recommendations of a meeting of experts held in November 2012. The initiative, led by UNODC, is part of the implementation of the outcome of the

Regional Conference on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights, held in Bamako in December 2011 with the support of UNOWA. The Network is aimed at strengthening knowledge on judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as well as building capacity for the prosecution of cases of illicit drug trafficking and other transborder crimes.

42. As part of the efforts to mobilize support for the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan, my Special Representative, at the invitation of ECOWAS, participated in the joint launch of the UNODC report, *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, in Abidjan on 25 February. He also provided support to the Kofi Annan Foundation in connection with the launch of the Commission on the Impact of Drug Trafficking on Governance, Security and Development in West Africa, in Accra on 31 January. The Commission, headed by former President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo aims to strengthen the implementation of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan, as well as regional and national efforts to address drug trafficking. Together with UNODC, UNOWA also contributed to discussions in the meeting of experts of the Group of Eight Plus Five on transnational organized crime in West Africa, hosted in London on 5 June, which, by focusing international attention on the issue in 2013, highlighted the intent of the Group of Eight to further the momentum set by its ministerial meeting held in Paris in 2011.

43. UNOWA continued to advocate for greater international political and operational commitment to the implementation of the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). To this end, on 11 March, the WACI Programme Advisory Committee adopted a revised regional strategy to be considered at the next WACI High-Level Policy Committee meeting. The strategy aims to maximize the partners' efforts by focusing on the development of transnational crime units and a related regional management structure. On 12 April, my Special Representative and the President of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Mireille Ballestrazzi, discussed ways to enhance support to West Africa. Meanwhile, UNOWA, UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and INTERPOL continued to cooperate on the implementation of the Initiative. Following earlier recommendations by the WACI Programme Advisory Committee, the WACI implementing partners fielded an assessment mission to Sierra Leone from 9 to 19 April. The mission concluded with proposals for the readjustment of international support for the transnational crime unit in view of the future drawdown of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Moreover, in March, Sierra Leone and Liberia initiated technical exchange visits of their respective transnational crime units, as part of a lessons-learned exercise to improve cross-border cooperation.

Counter-terrorism

44. At its forty-second ordinary session held in Yamoussoukro, ECOWAS endorsed its Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, as well as the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism. Meanwhile, UNOWA participated in the visit of the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to Abuja, from 19 to 22 February. During the visit, the Nigerian federal authorities reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate with international partners on counter-terrorism and requested the support of the United Nations.

45. On 17 May, I received a letter from President Goodluck Jonathan informing me of his decision to proclaim a state of emergency in three north-eastern States of Nigeria following increased terrorist attacks in the region, with a view to restoring normalcy. With respect to the security developments in the north-east of Nigeria, my Special Representative visited Nigeria on 10 and 11 June and met with senior government officials. He seized the opportunity to convey United Nations support for and solidarity with the authorities and people of Nigeria, while underscoring the need to ensure that the security sectors incorporate a human rights perspective in their work. He reiterated to the Nigerian Government the readiness of the United Nations to assist the country in implementing relevant regional, continental and international mechanisms and an associated framework to combat the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram.

Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

46. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2039 (2012), my Special Representative continued to work closely with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) to provide support for and facilitate the meetings of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) concerning the development of a regional anti-piracy strategy for the Gulf of Guinea. In this context, the interministerial Conference on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea was held in Cotonou, Benin, on 19 March, with the participation of UNOWA and UNOCA. The Conference reviewed and validated strategic documents, including the draft code of conduct concerning the prevention and repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activities in West and Central Africa; the draft memorandum of understanding between ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC on maritime safety and security in West and Central Africa; and the draft declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the two regions on maritime safety and security in their common maritime domain. The interministerial meeting also paved the way for the convening of a summit of Heads of State in Cameroon on 24 and 25 June.

Development of a subregional strategy for the Mano River basin

47. The Security Council, in its resolutions 2000 (2011), 2062 (2012) and 2066 (2012), encouraged ECOWAS and the Mano River Union to develop, with the support of UNOWA, a subregional strategy to address cross-border threats, such as movements of armed groups and weapons and illicit trafficking, with the assistance of UNOCI and UNMIL, as appropriate. On 14 January, my Special Representative and the President of the ECOWAS Commission agreed to convene a meeting in regard to the relevant Security Council resolutions. Subsequently, and further to consultations with the Mano River Union, my Special Representative convened in Dakar, on 29 June, a high-level meeting on the subregional strategy for the Mano River basin to identify concrete steps towards the development of such a strategy.

C. Promotion of good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and gender mainstreaming

48. UNOWA continued to provide support for efforts to protect human rights and promote gender mainstreaming. On 3 April, UNOWA and UNOM jointly organized in Dakar a seminar on the impacts of the Malian crisis on human rights, with the

participation of civil society actors. During the fifty-third session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, held in Banjul from 9 to 22 April, UNOWA organized, together with the Commission and the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, a panel discussion on human rights and the threats of terrorism and transnational organized crime in Africa.

49. From 16 to 18 April, UNOWA organized jointly with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), OHCHR, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in West Africa a regional workshop on strategic planning. The workshop led to the adoption of a joint programme on gender, peace and security in West Africa, as well as the establishment of associated national institutions. The meeting was opened by my Special Representative, who welcomed the fact that 11 of the 16 countries of the subregion had adopted a national plan of action on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security.

50. In Guinea, my Special Representative has placed specific emphasis on ensuring the full participation of women in his facilitation efforts. This led to the establishment of a consultative mechanism of women leaders, previously trained by UNOWA in mediation in 2012, who meet on a bimonthly basis to contribute to the current facilitation efforts. Their engagement is being supported by UN-Women, with the assistance of the Peacebuilding Commission.

D. Inter-institutional cooperation

United Nations inter-institutional cooperation

51. On 12 February, my Special Representative chaired the twelfth meeting of regional directors and representatives of United Nations agencies based in Dakar. The meeting reviewed the political/security situation in the region, in particular the Sahel, as well as maritime piracy, transnational organized crime, and peace consolidation efforts in the Mano River basin. He also continued to consult closely with my other Special Representatives in West Africa.

52. UNOWA continued to participate in the development of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, in line with Security Council resolution 2056 (2012). My Special Representative hosted discussions among various United Nations entities in Dakar in March 2013, and actively contributed to the finalization of the strategy.

Cooperation with regional and subregional partners

53. Since my previous report, UNOWA continued to provide support to ECOWAS in the implementation of its Conflict Prevention Framework. On 14 January, my Special Representative travelled to Abuja to meet with the President of the ECOWAS Commission to review the situation in the subregion. My Special Representative and the President also reviewed areas of cooperation between UNOWA and ECOWAS, including the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, the development of a strategic framework to combat piracy, the development of a subregional security strategy for the Mano River area, the development of regional strategies on counter-terrorism and the enhancement of governance in the

security sector. As a follow-up to the meeting, a desk-to-desk meeting of UNOWA and ECOWAS was held in Dakar on 14 June to review the ongoing political and security trends in the subregion and agree on a set of joint initiatives on the prevention of conflict and the promotion of good governance.

54. UNOWA also continued to provide support to ECOWAS for the incorporation of conflict prevention mechanisms into electoral planning processes, as part of the implementation of the 2011 Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa. From 18 to 20 June, UNOWA, in partnership with ECOWAS, the Open Society Initiative for West Africa and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a non-governmental organization, organized a workshop which brought together the presidents and representatives of electoral commissions from the 16 countries of the subregion to develop strategies and programmes to prevent, manage and mitigate election-related violence.

55. My Special Representative also continued to assist the work of the Mano River Union on the basis of the joint Strategic Framework of Cooperation for Peace and Security. He participated in the twenty-second ordinary session of Heads of State and Government of the Mano River Union, held in Monrovia on 30 April. At the request of the Secretary-General of the Mano River Union, UNOWA provided support for the cost assessment and programming of the Operational Plan for Peace and Security, adopted at the summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mano River Union held in Conakry on 15 June 2012. After the initial deployment of a consultant to the Mano River Union secretariat, UNOWA provided technical and financial support for the organization of a workshop of senior government experts, with the participation of ECOWAS and the United Nations, held in Conakry from 20 to 23 March. The workshop successfully consolidated the Operational Plan and assessed its costs. While UNOWA has committed itself to strengthening the capacity of the Peace and Security Unit of the Mano River Union, the concerned member States are yet to second staff to establish its structure.

IV. Observations and recommendations

56. West Africa continues to face numerous challenges to peace and security, mainly due to instability in the Sahel region, as manifested recently in Mali, as well as the effects of transnational organized crime and other cross-border issues affecting the countries of the Mano River basin and of the Gulf of Guinea.

57. The leaders of ECOWAS and the Mano River Union have shown a commendable commitment to strengthen regional capacities for conflict prevention and to build a collective security architecture. I encourage international partners to offer much-needed multifaceted support to these efforts.

58. I reiterate my appreciation to West African States and institutions for the role they played in addressing the crisis in Mali, in cooperation with the African Union, the European Union and France. As the United Nations takes over from the African Union on 1 July, we will ensure that strategic dialogue and operational coordination with the African Union and ECOWAS continues, including on dialogue and reconciliation. In that regard, I welcome the steps already taken by the ECOWAS mediation team, under the leadership of President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, with the support of the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union.

59. Recent attempts by terrorist groups to destabilize the Niger highlight the risk of the Malian crisis spilling over to neighbouring countries. They also remind us all that we need to remain focused on the Sahel and to support the efforts of countries in the region to address the root causes of instability. United Nations efforts in this regard will seek to complement measures taken by the States of the Sahel, West Africa and the Maghreb, as well as regional entities, including the African Union, ECOWAS, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States.

60. The implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel will require the sustained engagement of the United Nations system as a whole over a period of years. In order to maximize its impact on the region, its implementation should rest on the strong engagement of UNOWA and the United Nations system in the region with a view to creating a regionally owned mechanism. Regional early warning capacities across the Sahel will be strengthened under the lead role of UNOWA, with the support of all United Nations entities involved in the implementation of the strategy.

61. I am concerned by the growing impact of terrorism on the countries of the subregion, as demonstrated by the hostage-taking incidents and terrorist attacks perpetrated during the reporting period. I welcome the adoption of the ECOWAS subregional counter-terrorism strategy and call upon the international community to support its implementation. I also urge countries in the subregion to work on prevention, on addressing conditions that help to breed terrorism and on providing tailored responses to the varied threats, including speeches that incite violence and terrorism. To effectively tackle the problem, there is a need for more concerted efforts through an integrated and multidisciplinary response, encompassing security, development, good governance, human rights and the rule of law.

62. I welcome the efforts of the Government of Nigeria to resolve the Boko Haram crisis in the north-east of the country. While the United Nations fully supports the efforts of Nigeria to address acts of terrorism, I encourage its authorities to uphold human rights and international rules and standards in the conduct of its military operations.

63. I remain concerned about election-related tensions that affect the prospects for political stability and economic development in several countries in the subregion. In Guinea, I welcome the most recent efforts made by key stakeholders, including the President, to create the space for political dialogue with the opposition, with the support of the team of facilitators, led by my Special Representative for West Africa. I appeal to all Guinean stakeholders to rapidly and genuinely advance the dialogue process with a view to overcoming the technical and political obstacles to the holding of the long-awaited legislative elections.

64. I am concerned about delays in the holding of legislative elections in Togo and Mauritania. I call upon those countries in which constitutional order is yet to be fully restored, such as Mali and Guinea-Bissau, to continue working towards the holding of free and fair elections. I reiterate the readiness of the United Nations to work hand in hand with ECOWAS and other partners to ensure that countries adhere to the relevant normative frameworks, including the Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa.

65. Transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking are growing threats to West Africa's peace and stability. I welcome the decision of ECOWAS to extend

its Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa for an additional two years. I encourage the organization to update and revise the plan through a comprehensive and inclusive process in order to address complex issues, such as money-laundering and regional prosecutorial cooperation. I also welcome the conclusions of the WACI assessment mission to Sierra Leone and call on the international community to provide sufficient support for implementing its recommendations.

66. The governance of the security sector remains a key concern for the stability of States in West Africa. I encourage ECOWAS to finalize and adopt the subregional political framework and plan of action on security sector governance and reform. The United Nations stands ready to support the process.

67. In Guinea, it will be crucial to sustain the progress made in security sector reform, which is critical for the country's stability. I commend the personal commitment and leadership of President Alpha Condé in pursuing this reform and request Member States to continue to support the work of the United Nations security sector reform team in the country. I recommend the further extension of the team to continue providing strategic advice, as well as assistance on criminal justice in conjunction with the European Union, and the strengthening of international coordination in this area.

68. I am encouraged by the collective efforts of the subregion to counter maritime piracy, which is a growing threat to security and economic activities. I welcome the commitment of the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC to develop a regional anti-piracy strategy, with United Nations support as mandated by resolution 2039 (2012). In this regard, I welcome the holding of the summit in Cameroon and the adoption of the Code of Conduct concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa, which defines the regional strategy and paves the way for a legally binding instrument. I encourage all Member States in the region to sign and implement the Code of Conduct and I call on bilateral and international partners to provide the necessary resources.

69. I commend the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for its accomplishments in relation to the demarcation of the boundary between the two countries and encourage the Governments to continue their efforts towards resolving the remaining areas of disagreement, with a view to completing the mandate in compliance with the International Court of Justice ruling of 10 October 2002.

70. The final meeting of the Follow-Up Committee, marking the end of the transition period following the transfer of authority over the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, will be convened in New York in September 2013. In this context, I welcome the progress made through the effective implementation of the Greentree Agreement. I commend President Paul Biya of Cameroon and President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria for their dedication to this innovative example of peaceful resolution of border disputes, with the support of the United Nations. What has been achieved over the past decade thanks to the constructive attitude shown by the leadership of both countries, under the auspices of the United Nations, is gratifying and provides an example of dispute resolution that could serve as a model in many other situations.

71. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of West Africa, ECOWAS, the African Union and the Mano River Union for their continued cooperation. I also extend my gratitude to the United Nations entities in West Africa, civil society organizations and other partners for their continued collaboration with UNOWA in the implementation of its mandate. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, the staff of UNOWA and the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for their efforts to advance peace and security in West Africa.

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**General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5****Security Council
Sixty-eighth year****Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and
the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory****Identical letters dated 28 June 2013 from the Permanent Observer
of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council**

Despite the exertion of serious efforts aimed at salvaging the two-State solution and reviving negotiations for its achievement and the resolution of all outstanding issues and the conflict as a whole, the hopes and conviction of the Palestinian people regarding the possibility for peace are waning in the light of the continued settlement campaign being carried out by Israel, the occupying Power, throughout the land of the State of Palestine and other provocative and illegal actions that signal yet again Israel's rejection of the path of peace.

Once again, we are witness to Israeli actions reconfirming the Government's preference for occupation, annexation and domination of the Palestinian people and their land and starkly highlighting its unwillingness to respect international law and to act in good faith for the sake of peace. Provocative remarks by Israeli officials and illegal actions by the Israeli occupying forces and extremist Israeli settlers continue to boldly underscore Israel's disdain for the two-State solution and its relentless attempts to destroy it.

Settlements and so-called "outposts" continue to be expanded and entrenched; military orders for confiscation of Palestinian land and demolition of homes continue to be issued; Palestinian civilians continue to be forcibly displaced, especially in the areas of Occupied East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley; civilians continue to be arrested and detained on a daily basis; the occupying forces continue to use excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators and to cause civilian casualties; the blockade on the Gaza Strip continues to be imposed, inflicting grave socioeconomic loss and humanitarian hardship; and settlers continue to wantonly attack and terrorize Palestinians and their villages and properties, including religious sites. In addition to the exposure of plans for the construction of more than 1,000 settlement units, in the past month, hundreds of dunums of Palestinian land have been seized by the occupying forces, including more than 950 dunums in the



Nablus area alone; another 24 structures have been demolished, displacing 55 Palestinians, including 23 children; 457 Israeli military raids were carried out in Palestinian towns and villages, causing injury to 162 Palestinians, including at least 58 children and 8 women; and 455 Palestinians were arrested.

This is Israel's answer to the calls from every continent around the globe to cease its illegal policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and seriously cooperate with the initiative led by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, John Kerry, and his partners in the region and the international community. With typical intransigence and arrogance, Israel continues to undermine and make a mockery of international and regional positions and efforts towards the realization of the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders and the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace. While failure in this regard is not an option for the rest of the international community, including for the State of Palestine, Israel insists on dragging everyone down that dangerous path.

Yet again, plans have been revealed about the expansion of illegal settlements in Occupied East Jerusalem, with an announcement recently made regarding approval for the construction of a further 69 units in the settlement built at Jabal Abu Ghneim, referred to by the occupying Power as "Har Homa", on confiscated Palestinian land. Here, we recall that Israel's decision to construct a settlement there in 1997, also under the premiership of Mr. Netanyahu, led to the convening by the General Assembly of its tenth emergency special session to address illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Despite the clear position taken by the Assembly at that time and in subsequent resolutions, positions previously affirmed as well by the Security Council, and despite repeated demands for Israel to halt such illegal colonization activities, the settlement persists to this day. In fact, as indicated in prior letters, Israel has exponentially increased its settlement campaign, reaching a seven-year high in the first quarter of this year alone, in violation of the relevant resolutions and in grave breach of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Along with such illegal actions that are further fragmenting the Palestinian land and threatening the viability of the two-State solution, Israeli officials at the highest levels continue to make provocative remarks that are further poisoning the atmosphere and stoking tensions between the sides. Just last week, following detrimental comments by the Deputy Defence Minister, Israel's Minister of Economy and major partner in Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition Government, Naftali Bennett, stated that the idea of a Palestinian State was at a "dead end", rejected Israel's status as an occupier and, with regard to recent peace efforts, boasted to a settler council meeting that "never in the history of Israel have so many people put so much energy into something so pointless".

While the Palestinian leadership, to this moment, remains committed to the two-State solution and negotiations for achieving it and resolving all outstanding issues, we must take pause, along with the rest of the international community, and seriously assess the prospects for making it a reality under these conditions imposed by Israel, the occupying Power. Palestine has repeatedly made the necessary, difficult compromises for peace and President Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly confirmed our commitment and readiness, but, at this most critical juncture, we are

wary of empty negotiations for the sake of negotiations and alarmed about the deteriorating situation on the ground as a result of Israel's illegal practices.

Here, we recall the recent statements by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs before the Security Council that, "however much the parties need to reengage in negotiations as the only way to achieve the two-State solution, there must be a substantive and well-prepared framework, as well as a credible timeline, in order for the talks to have a chance of success" and that "there is also a need for a conducive environment on the ground". We thus reiterate our call upon the international community to exert the needed efforts to ensure compliance by Israel with its obligations under international law, which is essential for ensuring serious direct negotiations between the parties towards achievement of the long-standing objectives of the peace process based on the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Madrid principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map. The Council in particular has a responsibility based on its duty to maintain international peace and security. Here, we refer again to the affirmation of the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs that indeed "the international community bear[s] a great responsibility in transforming this possibility into reality". The time to uphold this solemn responsibility is long overdue.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 468 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 14 June 2013 (A/ES-10/596-S/2013/353) constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Riyad Mansour**
Ambassador

Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations



**General Assembly
Security Council**

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**General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 34**

**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and
their implications for international peace,
security and development**

**Security Council
Sixty-eighth year**

**Identical letters dated 28 June 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 27 June 2013, regarding the twenty-fourth round of the Geneva international discussions (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Giorgi Kvelashvili
Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Georgia to the United Nations



Annex to the identical letters dated 28 June 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the twenty-fourth round of the Geneva international discussions

The twenty-fourth round of the Geneva international discussions was held on 26 June 2013. The participants in the discussions took part, in an individual capacity, in the two working groups: Working Group I, which focused on security and stability in the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, and Working Group II, which focused on the issues related to the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the places of their original residence. The discussions were co-chaired by representatives of the European Union, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and attended by participants from Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States. The Head of the Provisional Administration of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District and the Chair of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, as well as the representatives of the Sokhumi and Tskhinvali occupation regimes, also took part in the twenty-fourth round of the discussions.

On 25 June, an information session was held on "The value and functions of unilateral commitments". The invited experts provided the participants with information on how unilateral declarations create a legal obligation for States. Discussions once again highlighted the importance of Moscow's legally binding commitment not to use force against Georgia.

In the framework of Working Group I, the participants from Georgia brought to the attention of the co-Chairs, with particular acuity, the deteriorating security situation on the ground, which poses a direct threat to peace and stability in the country. The Georgian participants expressed their deep concern over the installation of barbed wire fences and embankments by the Russian occupation forces across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions and over the expansion of the area of occupation, which contravene the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 and further violate the fundamental principles of international law, primarily with regard to Georgia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders. The participants from Georgia demanded that the Russian Federation stop and reverse these illegal activities, which lead to the serious aggravation of the security situation and extensive human rights violations and suffering. In this context, the co-Chairs called upon the participants in the Geneva international discussions to use the instruments provided by the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and organize agreed joint visits to the sites.

In Working Group I, the participants from Georgia emphasized that the deteriorating security situation in the occupied regions further demonstrated the necessity for the full implementation of the mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the creation of functional international security arrangements. The increased number of detentions underpins the importance of the resumption of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in its full composition.

In the framework of Working Group I, the participants addressed one of the central items of the agenda: the non-use of force. The group of experts that had been established at the twenty-first round was called upon to continue its work on a draft statement by the participants of the Geneva international discussions on the non-use of force presented by the co-Chairs. Although the meeting revealed the existence of substantial differences in the positions of the participants, the Georgian participants stressed their readiness to engage constructively in the drafting process. They also reiterated their firm position that progress could be achieved only after the Russian side made a unilateral, legally binding declaration on the non-use of force and reciprocated the pledge on the non-use of force made by Georgia in 2010 and reiterated and supported by the Parliament of Georgia in March 2013.

In Working Group II, the Georgian participants reiterated their priority to provide concrete and result-oriented responses to the existing humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected population and address the persisting violation of human rights in a tangible way. Georgia expressed its particular concern over the humanitarian and human rights consequences of the installation of barbed wire fences and embankments in the Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions, which affects the everyday life of people residing in the occupied regions and in their adjacent areas and restricts their right to liberty, security, protection of property, freedom of movement and education, as well as to other civil, social and economic rights. The participants from Georgia noted that Russia, as an occupying power exercising effective control over the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, bears responsibility under international humanitarian and human rights law for respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the population residing in the occupied territories. The Georgian side once again emphasized the importance of creating human rights monitoring mechanisms in the occupied regions and the urgency of facilitating humanitarian access for international organizations in those regions.

Within Working Group II, the co-moderators welcomed the unilateral steps undertaken by Georgia to address the issue of missing persons. The completion of water projects was noted positively and the importance of the continuation of the confidence-building mechanisms in the future was emphasized further.

Unfortunately, some participants in the discussions chose to walk out from Working Group II and attempted to join the other group. Faced with their disruptive attempts aimed at achieving a change in the existing practice with regard to the conduct of meetings, the co-Chairs suspended the work. The Georgian side expresses its regret over the destructive attitude of some participants, which hindered the work of the working groups and prevented the participants from making progress on the substantial issues of the discussions.

The Georgian participants remain hopeful that, thanks to the co-Chairs' efforts, the discussions at the next round will take place in a constructive and engaging manner. Georgia will continue its traditionally constructive cooperation with the co-Chairs to ensure that discussions in both working groups take place unhindered and that progress is made in the work on the realization of the main objective: to ensure the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008.

The twenty-fifth round of the Geneva international discussions will be held on 15 and 16 October 2013.

**Security Council**

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28 June 2013

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region**I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2098 (2013), in which the Council requested that I submit a report on the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.¹ The report covers developments since the adoption of the resolution and describes recent regional peace and security initiatives in relation to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and progress on the implementation of the Framework and on the establishment of regional benchmarks and appropriate follow-up measures, as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution.

II. Recent developments

2. The signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013, and the diplomatic and political initiatives that it inspired, has raised expectations that the protracted crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo could be resolved. However, the situation remains tense, with episodes of deadly fighting indicative of its continuing volatility.

3. The humanitarian impact of the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the region remains alarming. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the number of internally displaced persons rose to more than 2.6 million by early 2013, up from 1.8 million in early 2012. No longer limited to North and South Kivu, the crisis expanded to parts of Maniema and Katanga provinces in 2012 and has had a renewed regional impact, with waves of Congolese refugees arriving in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi on a regular basis since early 2012. Currently, some 110,000

¹ In this context, region is defined as covering the 11 signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, namely, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. In addition, the following four intergovernmental organizations act as guarantors for the Framework: the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community and the United Nations. For further information, see S/2013/119 and S/2013/131, annex.



Congolese refugees are in Uganda, 58,000 in Rwanda, 40,000 in Burundi and 63,000 in the United Republic of Tanzania. Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is also host to some 140,000 refugees, including from Burundi, Rwanda and Angola. Most recently, the deterioration of the security situation in the Central African Republic since December 2012 has forced some 37,000 people from that country to seek refuge in the Equateur and Orientale provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On a positive note, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda and representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees met in Kigali on 20 and 21 June to review the status of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While both countries have yet to address some critical issues, notably on identification and sensitization of refugees, this was an important step towards addressing a long-standing aspect of the crisis.

4. At the regional level, the delegations of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of *Mouvement du 23 mars* (M23) returned to Kampala for consultations with the facilitator of the peace talks, on 12 June and 9 June, respectively. This followed a three-month hiatus marked by an outbreak of short but heavy fighting within M23, and between the *Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) and M23.

5. The Kampala talks, facilitated by the Minister of Defence of Uganda, Crispus Kiyonga, under the auspices of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, in his capacity as Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), have progressed slowly since they began on 9 December 2012. At the time of preparing the present report, the two delegations have concluded discussions on one of the four agenda items: the review of the peace agreement of 23 March 2009 between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP). The three remaining agenda items are yet to be thoroughly discussed, including security; social, political, and economic matters; and the implementation plan for the decisions reached during the talks. Meanwhile, since the return of the two delegations to Kampala in June, the facilitator has been consulting with them, separately, on a draft agreement he proposed regarding the remaining agenda items, including on the modalities for an amnesty, disarmament and civil and military integration of M23 mutineers.

6. Against the background of the Kampala talks, a serious crisis erupted within M23 in late February, resulting in a split and subsequent fighting between two factions, led by General Bosco Ntaganda and Colonel Sultani Makenga, respectively. The leadership crisis revealed deep-seated, unresolved issues between the armed group's major constituencies, including a power struggle and tensions within the members' ethnic communities in North Kivu. It also brought to light the role of Bosco Ntaganda, whose membership had long been denied by M23.

7. While the facilitator of the Kampala talks continued to urge the military and political leadership of the factions of M23 to cease hostilities immediately, the fighting only came to an end on 16 March, with the fall of Kibumba, the headquarters of the pro-Ntaganda faction. Some 600 pro-Ntaganda combatants fled the fighting and crossed into Rwanda, including Bosco Ntaganda, Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga, the former M23 political leader, and Baudouin Ngaruye, a senior military commander in M23. Unexpectedly, Bosco Ntaganda surrendered to the Embassy of the United States of America in Kigali on 18 March and asked to be

transferred to the International Criminal Court. With the cooperation of the Governments of Rwanda, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, Bosco Ntaganda was transferred to The Hague on 22 March.

8. Other regional efforts have also contributed to the overall containment of the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 12 March, the President of Angola, José Eduardo Dos Santos, convened a mini-summit with the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, and the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila, in which they expressed their support for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and their intention to examine ways to coordinate their approaches to its implementation. On 24 March, the President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, convened a mini-summit in his home town, Oyo, attended by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame and the President of Uganda. The leaders welcomed the Framework and called for the resumption and conclusion of the Kampala talks. During the Organ Troika Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), held on 10 May, in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, the Heads of State of SADC, among other decisions, welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) and encouraged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23 to resume and conclude the Kampala talks in an expeditious manner.

9. Despite these political initiatives, the situation on the ground remained tense. On 20 May, heavy fighting occurred between FARDC and M23 near Goma, interrupting a six-month lull in the fighting between them. As a result of diplomatic efforts through various channels, including on the part of my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Roger Meece, the fighting ceased on 22 May. While there have not been any major hostilities since then, the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains volatile.

III. Activities of the Special Envoy

10. Since her appointment on 18 March, my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Mary Robinson, has held a series of consultations with leaders of the region and civil society groups. Against the backdrop of tensions generated by statements from M23 in reaction to the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO, she visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa and Goma), Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and South Africa from 28 April to 5 May. She met with the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President of Uganda and the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, and had a telephone conversation with the President of Rwanda, who was out of the country at the time of her visit. The Special Envoy also met with other officials, including the Minister of Defence of Uganda and facilitator of the Kampala talks, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the Special Representative of the African Union Commission for the Great Lakes Region, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, and the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Alfonse Ntumba Luaba. She intends to pursue her close consultations

with the leaders of the region, including visits to all the signatory countries to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

11. My Special Envoy held extensive meetings with United Nations country teams, the diplomatic corps and the donor community in all the countries she visited, as well as with MONUSCO, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), in Burundi. In each capital, she ensured that her consultations included representatives of civil society, notably women's groups, in an effort to build strong constituencies in support of the Framework.

12. The purpose of her visits was threefold: (a) to seek the views of leaders and others on the implementation of the Framework, particularly on the establishment of the oversight mechanisms and development of regional benchmarks; (b) to encourage participation in the first meeting of the regional oversight mechanism (known as the 11 plus 4 oversight mechanism, held on 26 May in Addis Ababa; and (c) to share her vision for and approach to the implementation of the Framework.

13. During her meetings with government officials, my Special Envoy discussed in detail their commitments as outlined in the Framework, stressing the need to ensure its full implementation. She called upon civil society groups to encourage their governments to respect their commitments and to hold them accountable. She stressed that equal importance attached to the implementation of the Framework as a shared responsibility, and that success would be predicated upon each and all parties living up to their commitments, given the considerable challenges ahead. She had summarized her personal vision for and approach to the Framework as Special Envoy in a document entitled "A framework of hope", issued on 28 April 2013.

14. From 22 to 25 May, I undertook a visit to Mozambique, followed by an unprecedented joint tour to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda with the President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, in support of the Framework. While the leaders of the States in the Great Lakes region are the key drivers of peace, stability and growth in that region, my visit with Mr. Kim was aimed at showing our commitment to ensuring that the political and security aspects of the Framework are pursued concurrently with its economic aspects.

15. To that end, on 23 May in Kinshasa, Mr. Kim announced a pledge of 1 billion dollars from the World Bank, in zero-interest financing, to support two major regional development priorities: the recovery of livelihoods to reduce the vulnerability of the people of the Great Lakes whose communities have suffered greatly during conflict in the region; and the revitalization and expansion of cross-border economic activity to spur greater opportunity and integration in the areas of agriculture, energy, transport and regional trade.

16. The World Bank's proposed additional funding includes roughly 100 million dollars in support of agriculture and rural livelihoods for internally displaced people and refugees in the region; 340 million dollars to support the 80 MW Rusumo Falls hydroelectric project for Burundi, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania; 150 million dollars for the rehabilitation of the Ruzizi I and II hydroelectric projects and financing for Ruzizi III, supplying electricity to Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 165 million dollars towards building roads in North and South Kivu and Province Orientale; 180 million dollars for infrastructure improvement and border management along the border between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and several millions of dollars in additional

funding for public health laboratories, fisheries and trade facilitation programmes, among others.

17. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President, the Prime Minister, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Governor of North Kivu and civil society representatives all called for the rapid deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO, arguing that the recent fighting between FARDC and M23 was a grim reminder of its necessity. I stressed that the Brigade was a tool in support of the comprehensive political approach contained in the Framework and cautioned that it could not substitute for FARDC, which bears primary responsibility for upholding territorial integrity and protecting civilians.

18. In Rwanda, Mr. Kim and I, with the President and some ministers of the Government, discussed concrete projects that could reinforce the economic integration of the Great Lakes region, notably in the energy and agriculture sectors.

19. In Uganda, discussions with the President focused on economic integration and the potential of the Great Lakes region, as a hub linking Eastern and Southern Africa. The President of Uganda has convened a summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, scheduled to take place on 31 July in Luanda, in consultation with the President of Angola, to further review recent developments in the region, including progress on the implementation of the Framework.

IV. Implementation of the commitments made under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region

A. Commitments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

20. On 13 May, the Council of Ministers adopted the presidential ordinance establishing the national oversight mechanism, as stipulated by the Framework. The national oversight mechanism will maintain a regular dialogue with all partners with a view to ensuring their support for the implementation of the Framework. On 21 May, François Muamba was appointed, by presidential ordinance, as coordinator of the mechanism's executive committee, along with two assistant coordinators. A former Minister of Industry and Economy and Minister for the Budget and member of the National Assembly, Mr. Muamba has also been a member of the Government's delegation to the Kampala talks with M23.

21. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has taken some initial steps to move forward on critical reforms. On 19 April, a revised law for a restructured Independent National Electoral Commission was promulgated, following arduous negotiations among parliamentarians. On decentralization, a series of additional laws were adopted, including some related to public finance. Also, as constitutionally required, the third Conference of Governors, chaired by the Presidency, was held on 18 and 19 March.

22. In the security and justice sectors, an action plan was adopted for the Congolese National Police and there were positive steps in the fight against impunity, including the trials and convictions in the military court system of perpetrators of serious crimes. A comprehensive military reform plan has yet to be

developed, although initial steps were taken towards the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force within FARDC. On 21 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Raymond Tshibanda, briefed the diplomatic community in Kinshasa on the Government's plans to reform the security sector, in particular the army and police.

23. Some measure of progress was achieved with regard to structural reforms. Policy development and implementation have focused on increasing public revenue mobilization, improving management of State revenues and expanding the payment of public employees' salaries through automatic bank deposit, which is already the case for army and police personnel, in order to reduce embezzlement.

24. Regrettably, increasing fragmentation, as well as wrangling among political and social actors, including within the majority coalition, have contributed to a more difficult environment for consensus-building. I hope that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to generate the will necessary to advance vitally needed but sensitive reforms.

B. Commitments of the region

25. On 17 March, following the crossing into Rwanda of some 600 combatants of the pro-Ntaganda faction of M23, Rwanda issued a press release indicating that the "soldiers and officers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have entered Rwanda have been disarmed and detained. Several wounded among them are receiving treatment with assistance from the Red Cross". Rwanda further informed of its consultations with several regional and international organizations to facilitate appropriate handling of the new group of refugees.

26. In a letter dated 24 March addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of Rwanda reported the presence of Jean-Marie Runiga, Baudoin Ngaruye and Innocent Zimurinda among the politicians and cadres of M23 who had crossed the border from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to seek refuge in Rwanda. The letter mentions the intention of Runiga to seek asylum in Uganda. The United Nations was also informed of the presence of Eric Badege in Rwanda, although his exact location is currently unknown.

27. On 26 May, on the margins of the Jubilee Summit of the Organization of African Unity-African Union, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and I co-chaired the first meeting of the 11 plus 4 oversight mechanism, in Addis Ababa. It was the first time that the leaders of the region had met collectively since the signing of the Framework in February.

28. The President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo offered an extensive account of the measures his Government had taken to implement the national commitments. Building on the outcome of my joint visit with the President of the World Bank, the participants in the meeting of the oversight mechanism stressed the importance of regional economic integration as a key driver for peace. They welcomed the recent meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) held on 9 and 10 May, in Bujumbura, and expressed support for its recommendation that a summit of Heads of State of CEPGL be held as soon as possible.

29. At the same time, the inherent political dimensions of the Framework were highlighted as critical, and the use of force as a measure of last resort. Participants noted that spoilers to peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained and welcomed the determination of the international community to take appropriate measures to deal with the threat posed by armed groups operating in the eastern part of the country, including by deploying the Force Intervention Brigade as part of MONUSCO. However, leaders of the region also reaffirmed the need to give a chance to dialogue with those stakeholders who accept it, and for appropriate political reforms and initiatives to be implemented.

30. While the meeting offered leaders the opportunity to reaffirm their commitments to the implementation of the Framework, more concrete actions have yet to be taken. In this respect, the leaders endorsed the establishment of a Technical Support Committee to develop a detailed plan for the implementation of the regional commitments, with benchmarks and follow-up measures. The Committee, composed of senior representatives of the 11 signatory countries, will also seek to resolve technical questions with a view to identifying common practices in the implementation of the Framework.

C. Development of benchmarks

31. The first meeting of the Technical Support Committee was held in Nairobi, on 24 June. Under the co-chairmanship of the United Nations and the African Union Commission, the Committee discussed a set of draft regional benchmarks, with indicators of progress. The Committee agreed to refine the regional benchmarks in subsequent meetings, before their presentation for adoption at the next meeting of the 11 plus 4 oversight mechanism, on the margins of the General Assembly, in September.

D. International commitments

32. As noted on several occasions by my Special Envoy, the implementation of the Framework is a shared responsibility. Following the first meeting of the 11 plus 4 oversight mechanism, my Special Envoy attended a meeting of the International Contact Group on the Great Lakes Region, held on 28 May, in Paris. She also visited New York on 3 and 4 June to attend a meeting on women and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region, organized by the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations. In all her meetings with international partners and donors, the Special Envoy encouraged them to further coordinate their efforts in support of the Great Lakes region, including with such institutions as the African Development Bank and the World Bank.

V. Observations and recommendations

33. The signing of the Framework has contributed to containing the protracted crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, the situation remains tense and prone to sporadic outbreaks of violence. This recurring cycle of violence poses a major obstacle to the consolidation of peace and greatly undermines development prospects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Meanwhile, the

mistrust that has developed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its eastern neighbours since the beginning of the crisis has contributed to heightened tensions on several occasions over the past year and continues to have an adverse impact on regional relations. However, I am encouraged to see that Governments and leaders of the region have continued to talk to each other, including on highly sensitive matters, either bilaterally or through regional organizations.

34. The past few months have been marked by a renewed sense of optimism generated by the political engagement of the international community in support of the efforts of regional leaders, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC, to improve the situation in the Great Lakes region. Having had a measure of success in containing the latest outbreak of violence, national, regional and international efforts must now focus on addressing the deep-rooted causes of the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

35. The Framework offers the opportunity to pursue peace, security and development objectives concurrently. With the momentum generated by the Framework, the leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region have the unique opportunity to create the conditions necessary for lasting security, stability and economic growth. In particular, the support of the World Bank Group can play a vital role in furthering regional economic integration, provided that trust is restored between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours.

36. The development of benchmarks at the national and regional levels is essential to move the Framework forward and ensure that progress on commitments can be measured against an agreed baseline. I welcome the establishment by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the national oversight mechanism and encourage the swift development of national benchmarks. I also urge the signatories of the Framework to develop regional benchmarks in a spirit of cooperation, through a process that helps build confidence among them. I count on their regular participation in and constructive engagement with the work of the Technical Support Committee established to define regional benchmarks.

37. While the Force Intervention Brigade is an essential element of efforts to address the threat posed by the presence of armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it does not constitute an end in itself. I encourage the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Parliament, political parties and civil society representatives to play their part in building the consensus needed to bring about the structural reforms outlined in the Framework and to lay the foundations for lasting peace in their country. In this regard, I welcome the intention of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to begin a national dialogue to foster national cohesion. I also welcome the resumption of the Kampala talks between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23, which remain a viable option for finding a peaceful solution to the crisis.

38. The United Nations stands ready to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the countries in the region in the implementation of their commitments under the Framework. I encourage leaders of the region to intensify their engagement in political dialogue with those stakeholders who accept it. In this respect, my Special Envoy will develop, in the coming months, an overall political strategy on the implementation of the Framework, building on existing national and regional initiatives, where relevant, and on my joint visit with the President of the World Bank to the Great Lakes region.

39. Ensuring the success of the Framework requires significant and sustained engagement and support from the international community. The United Nations, the African Union, SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region will need to work hand in hand to ensure that their political initiatives are closely aligned and in support of the comprehensive approach contained in the Framework. I therefore call upon the larger international donor community to collaborate with those institutions to maximize economic and development opportunities for the region, in the context of the Framework. This in turn will necessitate close coordination at the country, regional and international levels.

40. I would like to thank my Special Envoy, Mary Robinson, supported by her Special Adviser, Modibo Ibrahim Touré, for her inclusive approach and for the positive steps she has taken to date. She will continue to work closely with my Special Representative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the implementation of the commitments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. I count on members of the Security Council to lend their full backing to my Special Envoy and ensure that she has the necessary political support and resources to effectively discharge her mandated duties.



Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2098 (2013). In paragraph 34 of that resolution, the Council requested that I report every three months on the situation on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including on the implementation of national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region; progress made by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in the implementation of its mandate, including the transfer of activities to the United Nations country team; and the review of relevant planning documents; and implications of the possible operations of the intervention brigade for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and facilities. The present report covers developments that occurred since the issuance of my report of 15 February 2013 (S/2013/96).

II. Major developments

Security situation

2. In North Kivu province, the most significant development during the reporting period was the split between competing Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) factions respectively led by the rebel movement's commander, Sultani Makenga and his rival, Bosco Ntaganda. Full-scale fighting between these factions erupted on 24 February in Rutshuru town. On 27 February, Makenga issued a communiqué accusing the movement's president, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, of treason and corruption and relieving him of his functions. A further communiqué on 1 March called on M23 forces to apprehend rival senior leaders, namely Runiga, Ntaganda and Baudouin Ngaruye. On 7 March, Bertrand Bisimwa was announced by the Makenga-led faction as the M23's new president.

3. Factional fighting continued for several weeks. About 1,000 people were displaced and at least 5 civilians were reportedly killed and 35 others wounded during the fighting. Other armed groups, including the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), attempted to occupy positions abandoned by M23,



but were largely unsuccessful. The Forces armées de la République démocratiques du Congo (FARDC) proved more successful, regaining control of Mabenga, Kalengera and Rubare. On 16 March, Ntaganda, Ngaruye and Runiga, with several hundred combatants, fled to Rwanda, following their defeat by the Makenga-led faction. On 18 March, Bosco Ntaganda turned himself in to the United States Embassy in Kigali, and requested to be transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), in The Hague. On 22 March, with the support of the Governments of the United States of America, the Netherlands and Rwanda, Bosco Ntaganda was transferred to ICC.

4. Following the decision of the Security Council, in its resolution 2098 (2013), to establish the intervention brigade, M23 displayed increasingly aggressive behaviour. On 8 April, M23 blocked six MONUSCO civilian-contracted trucks at Kiwanja and Katale, claiming the cargo contained weapons destined for the intervention brigade or FARDC. Following a show of force by MONUSCO, M23 released the trucks. M23 representatives also made repeated media statements, threatening the intervention brigade and sent open letters to the United Nations and the parliaments of troop-contributing countries of the brigade. Furthermore, M23 held rallies throughout Rutshuru territory, inciting the population to demonstrate against the brigade. To avoid having to participate in the demonstrations, large numbers of civilians fled to Goma between 8 and 12 April. Throughout April, there were reports of killings, abductions, lootings and rapes perpetrated by M23 in Rutshuru town and Kiwanja.

5. Renewed fighting erupted between M23 and FARDC near Mutaho, about 10 kilometres from Goma, between 20 and 22 May, apparently initiated by M23. Both sides employed artillery in the clashes and FARDC attack helicopters engaged M23 positions. M23 mortar fire hit a residential area in Goma and several rockets struck areas near the Mugunga III camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The MONUSCO defence plan for Goma was activated, including placing quick reaction forces on alert. At least four civilians, including three children, were killed as a result of the clashes and nearly 11,000 civilians were displaced. After failing to advance and seize new positions, on 22 May, the M23 spokesperson announced a unilateral ceasefire.

6. Other armed groups remained active in the province, regrouping, recruiting and clashing with FARDC. Violence erupted from 27 February to 5 March, between the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) and FARDC in Kitchanga, in Masisi territory, resulting in the displacement of 5,000 civilians who sought refuge around the MONUSCO forward base in the area. Insecurity also persisted in the Grand Nord region, with a worrying increase in abductions. During the reporting period, the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) and Mayi-Mayi groups reportedly abducted 112 persons in Beni territory. Between 19 and 21 April alone, ADF/NALU abducted 46 civilians, including 11 children on the Kamango-Beni-Mbau axis.

7. The security situation in South Kivu remained precarious throughout the reporting period. Armed groups, including Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba, Mayi-Mayi Nyatura, Mayi-Mayi Mayele, Mayi-Mayi Bwasakala and Mayi-Mayi Mulumba continued negotiations with FARDC on integration, amid ongoing recruitment to swell their ranks. Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki factions remained active in Kabare, Walungu, Mwenga and Shabunda territories, after having pushed FDLR south

towards Mwenga and Uvira territories. There were continuing reports of infiltration of the Forces nationales pour la libération du Burundi (FNL) elements through various crossing points in Uvira territory. There were also persistent reports, during the period under review, of attempts by M23 to destabilize the province through proxies or alliances with local armed groups.

8. In Maniema, Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki groups expanded their presence from Shabunda in South Kivu into Punia territory around mineral rich sites. On 17 and 22 February, FARDC re-took control of Kasese and Punia villages from Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki. After being pushed southwards, Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki elements skirmished with FARDC along the Kasese-Shabunda-Walikale triangle, leading to population displacements.

9. In Katanga, the Mayi-Mayi group led by Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga, known as "Kata Katanga", intensified attacks against the FARDC and State authorities in Pweto, Manono and Moba territories. The group extended its reach north towards Kalemie and south towards Lubumbashi, while promoting a secessionist agenda. On 23 March, a group of over 300 Mayi-Mayi Kata Katanga elements launched an attack on Lubumbashi. According to provincial authorities, 27 persons were killed and 50 wounded during the incident. Despite the intervention of FARDC, a large group of Mayi-Mayi forcefully entered the MONUSCO compound. Following negotiations, they surrendered their weapons to MONUSCO personnel and were subsequently handed over to government authorities. With support from partners of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 40 children were separated from the apprehended group of Mayi-Mayi. The 23 March incident prompted President Kabila to replace the commander of the Sixth Military Region and the provincial heads of the police and the intelligence services.

10. In Orientale province, despite a slight decrease in attacks compared to the previous reporting period, small and mobile residual elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remained particularly active in Haut-Uélé district, targeting the Dungu-Duru axis and the Bangadi-Ngilima area. On 21 March in Digba, about 45 kilometres north of Ango, in Bas-Uélé, a group of 27 LRA abductees comprising 15 women and 12 children were released by the group.

11. In southern Ituri district, efforts to integrate elements of the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI) into FARDC were unsuccessful. On 1 March, FARDC launched a military operation against FRPI at Medu, Malu and Songolo, and took control of these areas. In northern Aru territory, a new armed group called the Forces de défense de la population locale de la Province orientale targeted positions of FARDC and the Congolese National Police. In Mambasa territory, Mayi-Mayi Morgan and FARDC deserter "Colonel" Hilaire Kombi Paluku carried out attacks against civilians in artisanal gold-mining areas.

Humanitarian situation

12. New humanitarian needs arose, mainly owing to continued fighting in North Kivu province, increased militia activity in Katanga and Maniema provinces, a continuous spread of epidemics, notably cholera in Lubumbashi, and some 40,000 refugees fleeing from the Central African Republic into Equateur and Orientale provinces. The total estimated number of IDPs stood at 2.6 million. An increase was registered in North Kivu province, where displacement rose by 15 per cent to a total

of 920,000 caused by armed groups' activity and the resulting FARDC response. While 428,000 people remained displaced in Orientale province, including 320,000 as a result of LRA activities, modest return movements and resettlements in urban centres, including Dungu, Faradje and Niangara, were observed during the reporting period. In Maniema, as a result of increased FDLR activity and Mayi-Mayi group activity, over 55,000 additional persons were displaced between February and April, bringing the total to 214,700 displaced as at 30 April. Also, during the reporting period, acute malnutrition rates in South Kivu, Katanga and the Kasais provinces were higher than the national 10 per cent emergency threshold.

13. The Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator visited Goma and Bukavu from 27 to 30 May to assess the situation of IDPs and exchange views with MONUSCO on humanitarian and protection issues related to the intervention brigade.

14. As at 12 June, the humanitarian action plan for 2013, estimated at \$893 million, was funded at 39 per cent. In March, the Humanitarian Coordinator allocated \$2.5 million from the Common Humanitarian Fund "reserve" to respond to the needs of 54,000 IDPs in Pweto territory in Katanga, while a \$15 million Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) appeal was launched in May to respond to the needs of refugees from the Central African Republic. An \$8 million CERF proposal was approved for refugees fleeing from the Central African Republic, while a \$4 million CERF proposal was submitted by UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) for urgent immunization against measles.

Political developments

15. On 19 March, the Supreme Court of Justice confirmed that the law establishing the Constitutional Court originally adopted in 2011 was in conformity with the Constitution. President Kabila returned the law to Parliament, recommending a review. On 11 April, the Senate proposed that the President sign the law as adopted and that a separate draft law be submitted to amend it.

16. On 15 April, the National Assembly rejected a motion of no confidence against the government of Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo that was tabled by an opposition member of the National Assembly, alleging violations of the Constitution and the mismanagement of public finances.

17. On 18 April, the Prime Minister held a press conference to review the 12-month record of his government. He highlighted improvements in the economy, which he attributed to rigorous fiscal management and improved governance. On 9 May, the Government released a report outlining the achievements of its first year in office. Other significant political developments are reported as part of the implementation of the national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, in paragraphs 62 to 76 of the present report.

Regional developments

18. Talks between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23 continued in Kampala but made little headway.

19. From 22 to 24 May, I conducted a joint visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda with World Bank President Yong Kim in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. On 26 May, I co-chaired with the President of the African Union Commission the first meeting of the regional oversight mechanism of the Framework. I have reported further on this trip and the Kampala talks in my report on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

III. Implementation of the mandate of MONUSCO

Protection of civilians

20. As of April, the protection cluster, led by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), recorded over 10,600 protection incidents in North and South Kivu.

21. MONUSCO employed a variety of means to address these developments, including the use of quick reaction forces, as well as static and mobile patrols. The priority of MONUSCO continued to be securing strategic positions in and around Goma, especially during the factional M23 fighting. In order to prepare for the deployment of the intervention brigade, MONUSCO closed four forward bases and repositioned those forces to strengthen defences for Goma. In addition, nine mobile bases were deployed in Ituri district to deter attacks by FRPI and Mayi-Mayi Simba. During the reporting period, formed police units also carried out 224 patrols around IDP camps in North Kivu. Demining activities also continued to contribute to protection of civilians' efforts.

22. Between February and April, MONUSCO deployed 30 newly recruited community liaison assistants in South Kivu and Katanga provinces, bringing the total number to 202, to support 75 forward bases and to help identify protection requirements. During the reporting period, 23 joint protection teams were deployed in North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale province to assess the security situation and to identify protection needs. Twenty-five community alert networks enabled 225 isolated communities in North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale provinces to contact local authorities or the Mission in case of threat.

Mission deployment and operations against armed groups

23. MONUSCO made preparations for the deployment of the intervention brigade. Pre-deployment technical missions and multidisciplinary teams specialized in training on human rights and protection of civilians were dispatched to the countries contributing troops to the intervention brigade. Planning for future coordination with humanitarian actors also began. The Brigade's headquarters was established in Goma on 23 April. MONUSCO concentrated the South African battalion in Goma prior to its transfer to the intervention brigade and the Uruguayan Force Reserve battalion was deployed in the locations vacated by the South African battalion to fill the vacuum. By 17 June, 1,232 troops of the United Republic of Tanzania and 808 South African troops had been deployed as part of the intervention brigade, while the deployment of Malawian troops is expected to take place by mid-July. With the deployment of the Intervention Brigade to Sake, in North Kivu province, it

is estimated that 95 per cent of the MONUSCO military component will be deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

24. A number of joint operations were conducted with FARDC. Joint standing combat deployments, joint riverine patrols on Lake Kivu and training in the use of MONUSCO attack helicopters in FARDC defence plans were undertaken. MONUSCO, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, continued to provide support to FARDC in operations targeting armed groups in North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale and Equateur provinces. In Katanga province, MONUSCO undertook extensive patrolling in Kongolo, Bendera, Kalemie and Moba to protect populations from the activities of Mayi-Mayi groups.

Safety and security of United Nations personnel within the context of possible operations of MONUSCO intervention brigade

25. MONUSCO undertook a full security risk assessment and review of its existing security measures and operating procedures during the reporting period. The aim of the exercise was to ensure the mitigation of risks associated with possible operations by the intervention brigade or any countermeasures by the armed groups and their implications for the safety and security of United Nations personnel, assets and facilities.

26. The threat to United Nations personnel emanating from armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, was assessed to include the risk of deliberate attacks, kidnappings and hijackings, as well as risks associated with the presence of unexploded ordnance and mines. MONUSCO and the United Nations country team updated operational plans to minimize the risks to humanitarian and development personnel and programmes.

27. The threats and the security risks confronting United Nations staff, premises and operations remained low in the western part of the country. The situation in the east was markedly different, with more than 51 security incidents recorded between 15 February and 8 May. On 23 March, the Mission regional office in Lubumbashi, although not a direct target, suffered extensive material damage when Mayi-Mayi Kata Katanga attacked the city. Following this incident, MONUSCO adopted new defensive measures and procedures for all its regional offices, including measures to address situations of armed combatants seeking refuge or surrendering at United Nations facilities. An attempt by armed men on 21 April to break into the MONUSCO camp at Munigi, north of Goma, left one attacker dead. On 7 May, a MONUSCO military convoy was ambushed by armed assailants 18 kilometres from Bukavu in South Kivu. One MONUSCO soldier was injured and later died. FARDC arrested two suspects on 8 May; and further investigations are ongoing to ascertain the motives of the attack.

Monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo

28. MONUSCO continued preparations for reinforcing its surveillance capabilities, including the deployment of unarmed, unmanned aerial systems. The technical assessment of proposals for deployment of these systems is under way. Efforts were

made to monitor movements along the eastern border areas in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. Maritime radars installed on the shores of Lake Kivu enabled a better understanding of movements and activities on the Lake. During the reporting period, MONUSCO received reports of alleged external support to M23.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

29. During the reporting period, foreign combatants and dependants from Congolese and foreign armed groups voluntarily participated in the MONUSCO disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. It included 48 foreign elements from M23, among whom 46 were verified to be Rwandan, 1 Ugandan and 1 Kenyan. With regard to FDLR, 119 foreign combatants, 123 of their dependants and 5 children associated with armed groups voluntarily participated in the MONUSCO disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. In addition, 720 Congolese members of armed groups were received by MONUSCO, of whom 242 were M23 members and 89 FDLR members.

30. In May 2013, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took a first step towards establishing a new national programme by preparing a draft of a single and overarching disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration plan for both foreign and Congolese armed groups. A strategic working group on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration was established between MONUSCO and the United Nations country team to support this plan, which is expected to handle an estimated caseload of 14,000 Congolese beneficiaries and 3,000 foreign elements. Adequate funding remains a major challenge for this plan.

Mine action

31. During the reporting period, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) removed 1,477 unexploded ordnance and disposed of 2,500 rounds of small arms ammunition. Moreover, UNMAS delivered mine risk education to 24,565 people. In May, in direct support to MONUSCO operations, UNMAS coordinated a nationwide landmine contamination survey with a view to providing an accurate threat assessment in the Mission area of operation. UNMAS also continued to support MONUSCO in ammunition and weapons safety management.

Security sector reform

32. Through the good offices of my Special Representative, MONUSCO continued to advocate with government officials and to offer the support of the United Nations for the reform of the security and justice sectors, especially army reform, which President Kabila identified as a major priority of the Government in his New Year address. MONUSCO also continued efforts aimed at strengthening coordination among national authorities and international partners on these reform efforts.

33. On 10 May, the Supreme Council of Defence, chaired by President Kabila, endorsed a general training plan for FARDC with a view to implementing the road map for the creation of a rapid reaction force within FARDC. MONUSCO is supporting FARDC in setting up a battalion tactical training centre in Kisangani, which will carry out a six-month training and mentoring programme for the rapid reaction force. On 21 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo briefed the diplomatic corps in Kinshasa on the Government plans for security sector reform, in particular army and police reform.

34. During the reporting period, MONUSCO completed a one-month refresher training course for the FARDC 321st battalion in the Luberizi Camp, 80 kilometres south of Bukavu in South Kivu, which deployed back to North Kivu. The battalion was instrumental in preventing M23 advances during the clashes of 20 and 22 May in the Goma area. MONUSCO also conducted training for other FARDC units deployed in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, with the aim of enhancing their operational capacities. Under the above-mentioned training plan and road map, MONUSCO plans to support FARDC in establishing three training centres in Luberizi and Rwindi, North Kivu and in Rwampara, Ituri district.

35. MONUSCO and other international partners have also continued to provide technical assistance and financial support for the ongoing training of new FARDC recruits, in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

Police

36. In the area of police reform, MONUSCO police experts, under the auspices of the national Executive Secretariat of the Steering Committee of Police Reform, participated in the preparation of two draft decrees on the organization and functioning of a general directorate for police schools and training centres, and Congolese National Police provincial commissariats.

37. In March, MONUSCO conducted basic training for a total of 973 Congolese National Police cadets, including 43 women, in the Kapalata and Kasangulu training centres in Orientale and Bas-Congo provinces, respectively. Also in March, specialized training was offered in investigative techniques for sexual and gender-based violence to 134 Congolese National Police officers from the Criminal Investigation Department, in community policing to 837 Congolese National Police trainees and in computer technology to 100 senior officers. A refresher training course in crowd control techniques was carried out in Mbuji-Mayi, Kasai Oriental province for 264 Congolese National Police personnel, including 20 women. MONUSCO also developed a project for the training and equipment of a police detachment for the security of IDP camps and another project to expand the capacity of the Congolese National Police Mugunga Training Centre from 500 to 1,000 trainees a year.

38. On 8 April, the Government adopted a \$800 million five-year action plan (2012-2016), based on the long-term strategic framework (2010-2025) for police reform. On 3 June, President Kabila promulgated the Police Service Act.

Justice and correction institutions

39. MONUSCO and United Nations agencies continued to assist in the reform of the justice system, including making progress towards the finalization of the United Nations multi-year joint justice programme.

40. The United Nations provided substantial support for strengthening the criminal justice system in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to fight impunity for sexual violence and other serious crimes. This assistance encompassed the provision of infrastructure, organizing legal clinics and supporting investigations. With MONUSCO support, by March, 115 out of 120 civilian justice officials and 19 out of 23 military justice officials had resumed office in Goma, after having fled the city when it was occupied by M23 in November 2012.

41. Support provided for the deployment of mobile courts resulted in 234 cases being heard and 54 judgments rendered by civilian and military judges. Support was also provided for the conduct of 82 judicial inspections of detention cells, resulting in the regularization of 322 cases of irregular detentions and 142 releases. Cases of pretrial, prolonged and arbitrary detention were also reduced owing to advocacy and enhanced prison record management. MONUSCO also received four additional requests for support from its prosecution support cells during the reporting period, bringing the total number of such requests made since 2011 to 32.

42. MONUSCO trained 84 prison staff from North Kivu and South Kivu provinces on prison administration, security and operations. These staff will be deployed to the prison facilities newly constructed in those provinces under the Government stabilization and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas. A six-month course to train 100 military officers to be deployed in military prisons commenced on 4 March in Kinshasa.

Human rights

43. The Mission continued to investigate serious allegations of human rights abuses. As mentioned in paragraph 6, from 27 February to 5 March, APCLS combatants and soldiers of the 812th FARDC Regiment clashed in Kitchanga, in Masisi territory, North Kivu province, using heavy weaponry. During the clashes that saw both sides targeting the civilian population, at least 27 civilians, including 10 children and 2 women, were reportedly killed and 89 wounded. Two women, including a minor, were also reportedly raped by FARDC soldiers before being killed. More than 500 houses were reportedly looted and/or destroyed; hospitals and property belonging to humanitarian organizations were also damaged.

44. During the reporting period, several killings and other human rights violations were reportedly committed by combatants in clashes between FARDC and Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki in Shabunda, Walungu and Mwenga territories, South Kivu province.

45. The human rights situation in Katanga province remained of great concern. Mayi-Mayi Kata Katanga elements were reportedly responsible for serious human rights violations, including rape, killings, enforced disappearance and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in Mitwaba, Manono, Pweto and Malemba Nkulu. Serious human rights violations were also reportedly committed by FARDC soldiers

in the scope of operations against Mayi-Mayi groups. MONUSCO investigations concluded that Congolese National Police agents and FARDC soldiers used disproportionate force against the Mayi-Mayi elements who attempted to attack Lubumbashi on 23 March. This resulted in at least three civilians killed and six injured.

46. On 13 March, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office issued a report on the human rights situation in detention centres across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, stating that 101 persons had died in detention in 2012. The deaths were mainly caused by poor conditions such as overcrowding, malnutrition, limited access to health care, torture, ill-treatment and the lack of accountability of the prison system.

47. During the reporting period, there were several positive developments in the fight against impunity. These include the transfer of Bosco Ntaganda to ICC on 22 March; the transfer from Kinshasa to Bukavu, on 2 April, of Lieutenant Colonel Bedi Mobuli Engwangenla, alias "Colonel 106", to stand trial before the Military Court of South Kivu for war crimes and crimes against humanity; the reopening of judicial proceedings against Cobra Matata of FRPI by the Ituri Military Garrison on 18 April; and the resumption of the trial of General Kakwavu for war crimes and crimes against humanity at the High Military Court in Kinshasa on 19 April. At least four FARDC soldiers were convicted during the period under review for acts of torture.

48. On 8 May, MONUSCO published a report on human rights violations committed by FARDC soldiers and M23 combatants, including those committed in and around Minova, between 15 November and 2 December 2012. MONUSCO continued to advocate for the prosecution of FARDC soldiers responsible for the mass rape of women and girls and other human rights violations committed. Following the collection of a large number of testimonies, including from over 200 alleged rape survivors, 12 senior FARDC officers were suspended and 11 FARDC suspects arrested in relation to the violations committed. The investigations are ongoing.

Sexual violence

49. As at 30 April, MONUSCO recorded cases of sexual violence involving at least 320 women, including 129 girls, that were allegedly committed by armed groups and national security forces, mostly in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Incidents involving FARDC elements occurred predominantly during troop movements or operations against armed groups in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.

50. According to UNICEF, medical and psychosocial assistance was provided to 7,556 persons, including 3,358 children, during the reporting period within the framework of assistance to survivors of sexual violence.

51. My Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 20 to 30 March, and held meetings with President Kabila, Prime Minister Matata Ponyo and a wide range of other stakeholders in Kinshasa, North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale provinces. Her mission culminated in a joint communiqué between the Government and the

United Nations on measures to address sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Children and armed conflict

52. During the period under review, the monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children, co-led by MONUSCO and UNICEF, documented the cases of 94 Congolese children (34 girls and 60 boys) who were recruited by armed groups between 1 February and 24 May, 28 of whom were under the age of 15. Most of the children were used as porters, cooks, fighters and sex slaves. The mechanism also documented the cases of 485 children (85 girls and 373 boys) who escaped or were separated from armed forces and groups. These cases included 26 boys associated with M23, 8 of whom were Rwandans. The mechanism also documented the cases of 33 children who were killed or maimed as a direct result of conflict-related violence during the reporting period.

53. The United Nations Country Task Force on Children and Armed Conflict secured the release and the separation of 150 children from Mayi-Mayi Kata Katanga, Mayi-Mayi Shetani and Mayi-Mayi Nyatura. Also as a result of increased advocacy and collaboration with the Government, 96 children formerly associated with armed groups were released from detention facilities belonging to FARDC or other security services. Five boys were separated during the screening of new FARDC recruits.

54. MONUSCO trained over 2,200 Congolese National Police and FARDC members in child protection measures and child rights. Regarding the implementation of the joint Government/United Nations action plan, two directives were signed by the Administrator General of the National Intelligence Agency, Kalev Mutondo, and the Minister of Defence, Luba Ntambo, on 3 May and 7 May, respectively. These directives, inter alia, criminalize the recruitment of children and authorize the release of children detained for their association with armed groups to the relevant State institutions and/or the United Nations.

Extraction and trade of natural resources

55. MONUSCO continued to support the joint validation exercises for mining sites in the Kivus and Maniema in anticipation of the establishment of Government-authorized "sales centres" around such sites, and in conducting security assessments of the sites.

Stabilization and peace consolidation progress

56. The strategic review of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy was finalized in June following consultations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all Strategy partners, including MONUSCO. This new approach articulates stabilization activities on the basis of area-specific needs, identified locally through an inclusive dialogue among communities and between these communities and State authorities. Consultations were also held with the Government to ensure the progressive alignment of the

revised Strategy with the stabilization and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas, and to agree on a common way forward and a time frame for implementation. A mapping is being prepared to identify funding gaps for the Strategy and the stabilization and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas.

57. The second round of national consultations for the post-2015 development agenda was carried out from 21 March to 30 April, involving representatives from government, civil society and international partners to agree on concrete strategic objectives. The consultations provided an opportunity to discuss the draft Fragility Matrix for the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States programme with stakeholders at the provincial level. To follow up on the consultations, a national seminar co-chaired by the Deputy Special Representative, Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator and the Prime Minister took place from 27 to 28 May.

Mission reconfiguration and road map for the transfer of responsibilities

58. In March, MONUSCO and Government representatives conducted joint assessments of security conditions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The security and humanitarian situation and progress in the extension of State authority were assessed in 31 territories throughout Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga provinces. Field visits were undertaken to gather information, except for in the areas of North Kivu under the control of M23. The assessment teams concluded that MONUSCO deployment, as adjusted throughout the reporting period, with a concentration of resources in the eastern part of the country, was appropriate to the situation on the ground.

59. Following the adoption of resolution 2098 (2013), MONUSCO focused on revising its Mission concept, commenced implementation of the revised Force concept of operations and trained its contingents on the revised rules of engagement.

60. As requested under resolution 2098 (2013), the annex to the present report sets out the current division of labour between MONUSCO and the United Nations country team in key areas of the mandate of the Mission. The Mission and the United Nations country team began discussing the requirements for transferring responsibilities related to demining and technical support to the electoral process as soon as feasible. Some challenges were identified in that regard. The operations of the intervention brigade will undoubtedly increase requests for UNMAS interventions to clear items of unexploded ordnance left over from military operations. The United Nations will be left with no capacity to respond to explosive contamination from fighting, hampering its ability to operate safely and increasing the possibility that both civilians and United Nations personnel will be killed or injured by unexploded weapons. At present, both the national authorities and the United Nations country team lack the capacity, in particular the technical expertise, to carry out demining activities. Moreover, there is no indication that extrabudgetary funding will be readily available.

61. Concerning technical support to the electoral process, with the establishment of the restructured Independent National Electoral Commission on 7 June, the electoral process can now resume. The temporary closing on 31 March of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to support the electoral cycle

leaves the MONUSCO electoral assistance division as the main source of international support to the new Independent National Electoral Commission.

62. The United Nations system, at Headquarters and in the field, is working on developing a detailed road map for transferring some responsibilities from the Mission to the United Nations country team, the Government or other partners. The road map will build on the matrix contained in the annex to the present report and highlight political implications, funding gaps and the most feasible timelines. It will be based on the principle of promoting national ownership and ensuring that the planning process for the transfer of tasks is aligned with the Government's development strategies and national budget processes. The road map will also be designed in a manner to maximize the collective contributions and impact of the United Nations country team. I will present this road map to the Council in my report in September.

IV. Progress on implementation of national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region

National oversight mechanism

63. Throughout the period under review, my Special Representative maintained ongoing discussions with representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at all levels to encourage a timely and effective follow-up to national commitments made under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including the establishment of a national oversight mechanism. These exchanges continued during the visit of Special Envoy Mary Robinson to Kinshasa, who, together with my Special Representative, met on 29 April with President Kabila and Prime Minister Matata Ponyo, as well as civil society leaders.

64. On 7 and 8 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared before the National Assembly to answer questions related to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The debate touched on the objectives of the Framework, its constitutional conformity, the reasons why M23 had not been mentioned in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and the supposed lack of consultation with Parliament prior to its signing. Members of the National Assembly, from the majority and the opposition, criticized the "inequities" of the Framework, claiming that it spelled out specific obligations for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was vague regarding those of other signatories.

65. On 13 May, the Council of Ministers adopted the presidential ordinance establishing the national oversight mechanism, as called for by the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. Signed by the President and the Prime Minister, the ordinance establishes a three-tiered mechanism for implementing, monitoring and reporting on the national commitments under the Framework, for a period of one year, which can be renewed. At the policy and decision-making level, a steering committee is chaired by President Kabila, with Prime Minister Matata Ponyo and six ministers representing the Government. The second level is the Executive Committee, which will focus on implementing and monitoring progress in the six reform areas outlined in the Framework. Thirdly, a consultative committee presided

over by President Kabila will serve as a vehicle for dialogue and exchange of views with various sectors of Congolese society. The mechanism is expected to maintain a regular dialogue with all partners on support for the implementation of the Framework. On 21 May, another presidential ordinance was signed, appointing François Muamba as the Coordinator of the Executive Committee, along with two assistant coordinators. A former Minister and member of the National Assembly, the Coordinator has also been a member of the Government delegation to the Kampala talks.

Efforts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in security sector reform

66. As mentioned in paragraphs 32 to 38, progress was made in developing a comprehensive security sector reform plan to establish effective and accountable security institutions.

Consolidation of State authority

67. Progress in the consolidation of State authority was very limited during the period under consideration, in particular owing to the impact of the M23 rebellion, with renewed fighting in North Kivu province, and the continued activity of other armed groups throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Decentralization

68. There were some advances in establishing the legal framework for the decentralization process and related issues on public finances. However, much remains to be done. The development of an agreed national implementation timetable and improved intergovernmental coordination will be critical to move the process forward. Also, the transfer of a number of competencies and resources to provincial and local administrations is still pending, and involves a number of highly sensitive political issues.

69. The third Conference of Provincial Governors, presided over by President Kabila, was held from 18 to 19 March, in Kananga, Kasai Occidental province. The conference recommended that the Government accelerate the decentralization process and take steps to organize provincial and local elections as soon as possible. It also acknowledged efforts by central authorities to ensure the regular retrocession of revenues to provincial governments.

70. On 29 March, an agreement was signed between the central and provincial governments establishing modalities for the transfer of investment credits allocated under the national budget to provincial governments for sectors under their exclusive administration, such as health, education and infrastructure.

71. On 30 April, the Senate adopted a series of laws on fiscal reforms, including some related to decentralization. Other laws related to decentralization are pending before the National Assembly, namely, the draft organic law establishing the boundaries of the future 25, subdivided provinces and the city of Kinshasa and the

draft organic law on the functioning of the Caisse de péréquation, a mechanism for redistributing revenues among provincial governments.

Economic development

72. Relative macroeconomic stability was preserved during the reporting period, with low inflation rates and a projected economic growth rate of 8.2 per cent according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Translating this growth into progress in reducing extreme poverty remains a challenge. During the period under review, 71 per cent of the Congolese population was still living on less than \$1.25 per day, access to basic services remained limited, the level of social security was low and two thirds of the labour force, mainly the youth, continued to be unemployed. Reviewing economic and social indicators, the UNDP 2013 Human Development Report ranked the Democratic Republic of the Congo 186th out of 186 countries assessed. However, with the joint efforts of the Government and international partners, measures are being taken to reduce the prevalence of underweight children and maternal deaths at childbirth and to increase life expectancy at birth.

Structural reforms of government institutions, including financial reforms

73. On 13 April, the Senate adopted the law concerning the accession of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and referral by a court to arbitration. The instrument of accession has yet to be deposited with the Secretariat.

74. Citing a lack of transparency in the mining sector, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative suspended the membership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for one year on 17 April. Government and IMF representatives met in Washington, D.C., from 19 to 21 April, where the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo pledged to produce information on measures to improve governance. On 7 May, the Minister of Mines, Martin Kabwelulu, and the Chairman of the State-owned Gécamines, Albert Yuma, signed an affidavit releasing details of a 2011 deal transferring part of a Gécamines copper and cobalt project to a private Israeli company. This opened the way for IMF to begin negotiations on a new loan programme. Also, new policies have focused on increasing the mobilization of State revenues, improving management of State revenues and expanding the payment through automatic bank deposit of the salaries of civil servants and army and police personnel in order to reduce the risks of embezzlement. On 13 June, the National Assembly adopted the organic law on the establishment of a National Council on Economic and Social Affairs, which provides an institutional forum for civil society to present its views on relevant Government policies and actions.

Reconciliation, dialogue and democratization

75. During the reporting period, National Assembly Speaker Aubin Minaku, in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the presidential majority coalition, concluded consultations with a wide range of Congolese stakeholders on the holding of a

national dialogue as proposed by President Kabila in his New Year address. In parallel to the President's initiative, opposition parties and civil society organizations held consultations on the organization of a national forum on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reaching out to the presidential majority to try to build a broad consensus on the terms of reference for a national dialogue. Discussions are still under way.

76. In a critical step towards reviving the electoral process, President Kabila promulgated the revised organic law on the Independent National Electoral Commission on 19 April. The reformed Commission consists of two organs, the Board and the Plenary, totalling 13 members, of which six members are nominated by the parliamentary majority, four by the opposition and three by civil society. The six-member Board, headed by a President, nominated by civil society, forms part of the Plenary. On 7 June, following broad and intensive national consultations led by National Assembly Speaker Minaku, the Assembly endorsed a resolution nominating the new members of the reformed Commission. The latter will be headed by Abbot Apollinaire Malu Malu from civil society, who had previously served as President of the Commission from 2004 to 2011. On 12 June, President Kabila signed a decree appointing the members of the Commission, who were later sworn in by the Supreme Court of Justice on 14 June.

77. In Equateur province, preparations for the election of a new governor proceeded following President Kabila's decision of 13 March to dismiss Governor Baende owing to the persistent institutional crisis in the province. On 7 and 10 June, the elections took place, with Louis Alphonse Koyajialo and Impeto Pengo Sébastien from the ruling presidential majority coalition elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively.

V. Observations

78. The signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in Addis Ababa on 24 February has brought renewed hope that security and stability can be restored in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. I welcome the steps already taken by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fulfil its commitments under the Framework, including the establishment of a national oversight mechanism, chaired by President Kabila himself. I also welcome the advances made in the areas of decentralization, reform of the security and justice sectors, reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission, particularly with a view to preparing the provincial and local elections. I am encouraged by the progress made towards the organization of a national dialogue that would build consensus among a wide range of Congolese actors on how best to advance critical reforms and policies.

79. These initial undertakings, once brought to fruition, together with other reforms mentioned in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, would not only contribute to strengthening the population's confidence in the country's institutions and addressing some of the root causes of the conflict, but would also help lay solid foundations for the development of the country.

80. It must be recognized that advancing these reforms will be a complex process, fraught with political, financial and security challenges. I am concerned, in this regard, about the increasingly difficult political environment that has developed in

the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Key institutions such as the Parliament and political coalitions appear to be increasingly fragmented. Political posturing and in-fighting are undermining cohesion and consensus-building, even within the presidential majority coalition. This clearly complicates the building of the necessary constituencies to support important and often sensitive reform agendas, especially the efforts by the Government to consolidate State authority. While the initial steps taken by the Government to implement the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework are commendable, a significant and sustained effort on its part would be required to achieve the expected results. I therefore call on the Government to redouble its reform efforts and urge all concerned Congolese actors to rise above their personal ambitions, overcome their divisions and find ways to work together to advance these complex reforms, which are essential for peace, security and development.

81. Significant and sustained engagement and support from the international community will clearly be essential to the success of this approach, in particular to help resolve complex problems and identify the resources necessary to achieve our common objectives. The United Nations stands ready to do its part, in particular by helping to coordinate assistance and maintain the momentum achieved so far. My Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in consultation with my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, will continue to actively support the implementation of the national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. I also urge all partners to provide the necessary political support and the significant financial assistance required to achieve these goals. I welcome, in this regard, the engagement of the World Bank in support of the Framework.

82. In spite of these advances, the security situation throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains deeply troubling. Significant security threats persist, not only in North Kivu and South Kivu, but also in Katanga, Orientale province and parts of Maniema province. The situation in North Kivu remains fragile, in particular owing to the continuing M23 rebellion, which puts civilians at serious risk, represents the most significant challenge to State authority and undermines efforts to stabilize this area. I have urged both M23 and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to resume talks in Kampala under the auspices of the President of Uganda. Any agreement reached through these talks should contribute to a durable resolution of the conflict. The evolving security situation in Equateur province also warrants close monitoring.

83. In this overall context, grave human rights violations, including abductions, rapes, ethnically targeted attacks on civilians and the recruitment of children into armed groups and national security forces, continue to be committed in conflict-affected areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These violations must stop. There have been some encouraging developments related to the prosecution of suspects by the Congolese authorities, including members of the military and former members of armed groups accused of committing serious violations. Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate in the strongest terms that impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity will not be tolerated. MONUSCO will continue to support the national authorities in investigating and prosecuting such crimes, including through its prosecution support cells.

84. Addressing the causes and consequences of the recurring violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue to require a comprehensive approach, the elements of which were presented in my special report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region (S/2013/119) and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2098 (2013). The deployment of an intervention brigade within MONUSCO represents one of these elements. Significant efforts have been made by the United Nations to ensure its swift deployment, and I wish to reiterate my profound appreciation to the countries that contribute troops to the intervention brigade for their collaboration. The intervention brigade has not yet undertaken the operations envisaged in resolution 2098 (2013) against armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, but its impact is already being felt. A number of defections and surrenders among members of armed groups may have been influenced by its deterrence effect. The protection of civilians remains at the core of military planning, which is based on international humanitarian law principles of distinction, proportionality and caution so that incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects are avoided. Advanced training has been provided to the contingents that will form part of the intervention brigade in the countries of origin, prior to their deployment, to familiarize them with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, as well as the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Further training will be provided once these contingents are fully deployed. There are nevertheless very high expectations being placed on MONUSCO, in terms of pacifying eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and neutralizing the threat posed by armed groups. It is, however, critical for all actors to understand that the effectiveness of the intervention brigade can be conceived only as part of the broader political approach. It cannot be a substitute for the national security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the pursuit of a coherent strategy to tackle the root causes of the conflict.

85. I would like to thank my Special Representative, Roger Meece, and all the personnel of MONUSCO and the United Nations country team for their tireless engagement and efforts. In particular, I wish to highlight the bravery and the determination of MONUSCO military and civilian personnel operating in what continues to be a very dangerous and unpredictable environment. I pay homage, in particular to the Pakistani contingent, which lost one of its soldiers when a MONUSCO convoy was ambushed by armed assailants on 7 May in South Kivu province.

Annex

Matrix reflecting the current division of labour between MONUSCO and the United Nations country team on tasks shared by the Mission, the country team and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Division of labour between the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and United Nations country team (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

United Nations Transitional Framework 2011-2013

MONUSCO

United Nations country team

1. Protection of civilians

Goal: Civilian populations are protected in conflict-affected zones

1.1 Protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,

including displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders

- Maintenance of an average of 93 forward bases to monitor and deter attacks against civilians and maintenance of 47 support bases to enable operations and to respond to developing threats; patrols and escorts by contingent troops in areas affected by armed conflict
- Coordination of protection of civilians' strategy and management of protection of civilians' tools (training package on protection of civilians, child protection, human rights and international humanitarian law, with practical scenarios, to train newly deployed troops, including the intervention brigade; joint protection teams; community liaison assistants; community alert networks
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: advocates with all parties to the conflict to protect civilians under imminent threat, promotes respect for international humanitarian law and ensures that all parties facilitate humanitarian access
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other United Nations agencies: advocate with parties to the conflict to respect the civilian character of internally displaced person (IDP) and refugee camps and sites
- UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Health Organization (WHO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and field partners: when security conditions permit, play a role in protection by presence and monitor in and around IDP/refugee camps and sites in conflict areas, including where MONUSCO troops are not deployed

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

United Nations Transitional Framework 2011-2013

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1.2 Identify threats to civilians and implement existing response plans to ensure the protection of civilians from abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children; ensure that child protection concerns are integrated into all operations and strategic

- UNHCR and protection cluster members: support local communities in developing protection mechanisms
- UNICEF and partners: set up child friendly spaces for the protection of children, advocate for, and take other measures to prevent the forced recruitment of children
- UNHCR, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and partners: set up safe houses for sexual and gender-based violence survivors
- UNHCR: ensures the protection of refugees
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): engages in advocacy on specific human rights cases and situations; engages with the Human Rights Council's special procedure mechanism; engages with the human rights treaty bodies
- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and UNDP: provides holistic services to women survivors of sexual and gender-based violence
- OHCHR: identifies human rights violations as well as risks of such violations, including sexual violence, recommends preventive and responsive measures and contributes to the development of community protection plans; identifies the nature, cause and patterns of human rights violations and consult with the local population and authorities to recommend measures to prevent or mitigate such threats in the medium or long term
- United Nations humanitarian agencies (UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA, among others): identify protection of civilians threats and needs in a coordinated manner;
- Conducts joint protection team and assessment missions to collect information, prevent potential threats against the civilian population and facilitate humanitarian access; develops community protection plans in coordination with Congolese authorities and community focal points to identify and mitigate threats and enhance protection response

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

United Nations Transitional Framework 2011-2013

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aspects; accelerate the implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence

- Conducts gender-awareness activities for national police officers, FARDC and administrative authorities at the national and provincial levels on women's security and protection issues
- Conducts capacity-building activities to support the engagement of women in protection mechanisms

set up early warning systems; develop and implement contingency plans particularly in areas not covered by MONUSCO; establish referral mechanisms for civilians who are victims of abuse and in particular need of specialized services; ensure the provision of prevention or response services to sexual violence victims; prevent forced recruitment with a special emphasis on boys and girls; attend to special needs of IDPs and refugees; and carry out mine action

- UNICEF and UNFPA: work with partners and the Government towards the implementation of United Nations/Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo action plan to prevent and stop recruitment of children and their use by armed forces and groups and other grave child rights violations, and the comprehensive strategy to combat sexual violence
- UNHCR and protection cluster: develop a protection of civilians response plan and support planning for the annual humanitarian action plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- UNICEF: manages child protection subcluster group; supports advocacy, prevention and response by mainstreaming child protection in all clusters
- UN-Women and partners of the national protection cluster: formulate strategic advocacy policies and engage human rights monitoring
- UNHCR: supports the issuance of land and civil documentation

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

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1.3 Joint assessment

Assesses progress towards implementation of objectives, including: threats of armed groups and restoring stability in sensitive areas; improved capacity of the Government to effectively protect the population through the establishment of sustainable security forces with a view to progressively take over MONUSCO's security role

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR and UNHCR: share relevant updated information on the humanitarian and protection situation in concerned areas

1.4 Human rights: Monitor, report and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses; support the United Nations system in-country to ensure that any support provided be consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law; good offices, advice and support to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to promote human rights and to fight impunity, with respect to human rights and international humanitarian law violations, committed by elements of the security forces

Carries out human rights monitoring and investigation missions to verify allegations of human rights violations; follows up on cases with relevant authorities and advocates for the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; ensures the implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy; conducts human rights awareness-raising activities and training for State actors, including national security forces

- UNHCR: manages the protection monitoring database; monitors and develops contacts and networks in communities; establishes sources of information; collects and documents protection incidents; produces reports on protection of civilians' incidents, human rights violations, among other items
- UN-Women and UNFPA: provide training of trainers and capacity-building of FARDC to ensure women's rights protection
- UNICEF: conducts child rights situation analysis

1.5 Children and armed conflict: Implementation of the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence against children by FARDC; mainstreaming of child protection issues within MONUSCO

- Provides advice, supports and co-chairs the joint technical working group to implement the United Nations/Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo action plan to prevent and stop children recruitment and use by armed forces and groups and other grave child rights violations

- UNICEF co-chairs the Country Task Force on Children and Armed Conflict (involving UNHCR, OCHA and other partners) and supports the national interministerial committee to ensure implementation of the national action plan
- UNICEF, UNHCR: contribute to the work of Child Protection Advisers and Working Group within the Protection Cluster

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

United Nations Transitional Framework 2011-2013

*MONUSCO**United Nations country team*

1.6 Sexual violence:
Monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement on conflict-related sexual violence

- Conducts the monitoring and investigations on grave child rights violations; carries out release and separation of children from armed groups; advocates and fights against impunity
- Supports the Government in implementing the priority action plan of the national strategy on combating gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and ensuring synergy with other pillars of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
- Ensure the implementation of the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement on conflict-related sexual violence, the deployment of Women Protection Advisers, the implementation of protection of civilians' strategies to address conflict-related sexual violence; conducts special field missions to investigate incidents of conflict-related sexual violence; engages with parties to conflict on the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence
- UNICEF (monitoring and reporting; response and prevention); UNDP (economic integration); International Labour Organization (economic integration); UNHCR (protection cluster-IDP camp management); IOM; OHCHR (monitoring and reporting)
- United Nations country team: provides support to: the formulation of a national policy on gender; the reform of the family law; the reform of the judicial system; the strengthening of the fight against impunity for sexual and gender-based violence; providing legal support to victims of sexual and gender-based violence; and the improvement of their access to the justice system
- OHCHR, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNAIDS: act as component coordinators of the national strategy against gender-based violence
- UNDP, UN-Women, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNAIDS, UNFPA, IOM: ensure the coordination and implementation of the national strategy against gender-based violence and HIV programme
- UN-Women: conducts the evaluation of the Technical Group on Sexual Violence (national strategy against gender-based violence/stabilization and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas)
- OHCHR: as the lead entity on the fight against impunity provides technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice in facilitating access to justice for victims of sexual violence

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

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1.7 Mine action

United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre/Mine Action Section of the Mission: (i) directs support to the protection of civilians and MONUSCO operations through mine/unexploded ordnance clearance and survey; (ii) conducts surveys of MONUSCO facilities and compounds; (iii) conducts risk education to the Force and the Mission civilian staff; (iv) carries out the destruction of weapons in cooperation with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration/Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration Division; (v) conducts the rehabilitation of armories and ammunition depots, in cooperation with the Security Sector Reform Division

- UNFPA: supports the Ministry of Gender in coordinating and monitoring sexual and gender-based violence issues

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides support to: (i) the emergence of national mine action institutions through the capacity development of the Centre congolais de lutte antimines; (ii) humanitarian United Nations country team agencies operations through the provision of mine/unexploded ordnance survey, clearance and risk education activities; (iii) Government to comply with international mine action-related treaties, including the implementation of a nationwide landmine survey

2. Stabilization

Goal: Areas affected by armed conflict are progressively stabilized and sexual violence is combated in the eastern provinces

2.1 Enable stabilization activities

Supports the extension and restoration of State authority in areas previously controlled by armed groups through the reinforcement of technical capacity-building for the police, justice and corrections institutions, civil administration, governance of natural resources and prevention of sexual violence

UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, OHCHR, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UN-Women and IOM: support to stabilization activities through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2013–2017 pillar 1, “Reinforce governance and peace”

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

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2.2 Good offices, advice and support to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the establishment of sustainable State authority and control in conflict-affected areas in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Carries out capacity-building workshops for civil servants on public administration competencies, planning and budgeting of local stabilization and reconstruction projects, in coordination with the United Nations country team

UNDP, through its governance programme is supporting the re-establishment of State authority, by working closely with the provincial authorities and local communities of North Kivu province, South Kivu province and Ituri district

2.3 Stabilization strategy: Ensure the existence of a coherent, comprehensive and adequate strategy for stabilization of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (the revised International Security and Stabilization Strategy) and its coordination, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, in full cooperation with the Government in the following areas:

Stimulates strategic reflections on the impact of stabilization activities and develop recommendations for adjustments; coordinates with all partners and the Government at strategic and implementation levels; conducts regular monitoring and evaluation; and reports on a quarterly basis

UNDP and other United Nations country team members: provide technical expertise on the transition from conflict and humanitarian interventions to development and stabilization

(a) Dialogue and conflict prevention/transformation;

Coordinates with the Government and international stakeholders to set up dialogue platforms in all the areas covered by the International Security and Stabilization Strategy

United Nations country team is fully involved

(b) FARDC effectiveness and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights;

Coordinates with the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and international partners to identify specific needs and develop joint programmes

- UN-Women and UNDP are working with the Ministry of Defence in providing training of trainers and capacity-building on human rights and in improving the military judiciary action against sexual and gender-based violence
- OHCHR: develops and delivers specific training modules on the protection of civilians for the respect of international humanitarian law and human rights by national security forces

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

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(c) Restoration of State authority in areas affected by armed conflict;

Provides technical expertise and logistical support for the capacity-building of police, justice and prison personnel, as well as civil servants (in coordination with the United Nations country team); and monitors the deployment of State agents to infrastructure built under the International Security and Stabilization Strategy

- UNDP: manages programmes for capacity-building of the local administration and civil society to strengthen the "social contract" at the local level
- UNDP: supports a capacity-building programme for justice and prison personnel
- IOM: develops and implements new modules for specialized training of the police
- IOM and UNOPS: undertake the construction of infrastructure (roads, administrative and court buildings; police academy; prisons)
- UNOPS: provides logistics support for police training
- UNICEF: supports access to justice for children

(d) Enable the commencement of sustainable and conflict-sensitive socioeconomic recovery;

- Coordinates with the Government and other stakeholders
- Ensures community resilience

- UNICEF: leads coordination on the following: agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), livelihoods and economic opportunities (UNDP, UNICEF), social cohesion (UNICEF), land conflict (UN-Habitat)
- UNHCR: supports the coordination of the stabilization and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas in North Kivu

(e) Ensure the revision of the approach to the fight against sexual violence

- Coordinates with the Government and other stakeholders
- Conducts strategic reflection on challenges and lessons learned, and develops new strategic orientations

Programme implementation: protection and prevention (UNHCR), multi-sector assistance (UNICEF), multi-sector assistance on sexual and gender-based violence and HIV (UNAIDS) and data collection and mapping (UNFPA)

2.4 Security sector reform: Encourage national ownership of security sector reform by the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities;

- Supports the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the political and strategic levels in undertaking army reform, including the establishment of the FARDC rapid reaction

- UNDP: supports the construction of barracks and capacity-building activities on small arms and light weapons control
- OHCHR: provides technical assistance for the establishment of the vetting process

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

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finalization and implementation of a national strategy for the establishment of effective, inclusive and accountable security and justice institutions by the Democratic Republic of the Congo; coordination of support for security sector reform provided by international and bilateral partners and the United Nations system

force; and the development of a clear and comprehensive security sector reform implementation road map, including benchmarks and timelines to establish effective and accountable security institutions

- Develops a matrix on the coordination of assistance in security sector reform

2.5 Police: Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government for the reform of the police in compliance with Human Rights Due Diligence Policy; training provided to battalions of the Congolese National Police

Monitors investigations, patrols, traffic policing, complaints, office duties and administration of detainees; conducts daily monitoring and holds technical assistance meetings with national police officials in 23 sectors and subsectors to ensure the proper implementation of democratic policing principles and to advise against misconduct

- UNDP: contributes to the training of police, equipped to protect people and property with professionalism and respect for human rights; helps to restore the legal administration in the territories formerly under the control of armed groups
- UNAIDS: contributes to knowledge, attitude and practices survey and the training of police on sexual and gender-based violence and HIV in Kinshasa and South Kivu
- OHCHR and UNICEF: human rights and law enforcement/child rights training/sensitization
- UNHCR: provides training and support to Congolese National Police deployed in IDP and refugee camps; funds provisions for setting up of police posts in Equateur province to facilitate the return of Congolese refugees from Republic of Congo
- UNFPA: conducts capacity-building for law enforcement officers on women's protection
- UNHCR: provides training and support to Congolese National Police deployed in IDP and refugee camps

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

Division of labour

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2.6 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration: Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government for the design of a single overarching disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration plan for foreign and Congolese combatants

Supports the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign combatants and dependants, with particular attention to women and children; and supports the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants of both Congolese and foreign armed groups. This includes support to the Government's development of the single overarching disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme, and ensuring that this plan and the outcome of its activities support the wider security sector reform objectives. In particular, MONUSCO is planning on supporting directly disarmament, demobilization (including short-term reinsertion) of Congolese elements, and the repatriation of foreign elements. The World Bank and other donors are being consulted on supporting demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

- The United Nations country team is working together with MONUSCO on supporting the Government national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, especially UNDP, on support to the reintegration aspect, and UNICEF on issues related to children associated with armed forces and groups
- The United Nations Environment Programme has initiated discussions with the World Bank on supporting demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants through "green jobs"

2.7 Justice: Support for the development and implementation of the multi-year joint United Nations justice programme; provision of support to national judicial processes for serious crimes; support for the establishment of an accountable justice system; support for the strengthening of court management services;

Leads, with UNDP, on the development and implementation of the multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme through collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; provides support to national and international judicial processes, through, inter alia, prosecution support cells, mobile courts and joint investigation teams

- UNDP: provides technical expertise, funding and results management services to the implementation of multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme; supports resource mobilization efforts are ongoing
- UNFPA: provides technical support on the clinical management of rape survivors, including medical, psychosocial care for rape survivors, and on data collection

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1966 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

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provision of support to national and international judicial processes: support to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including through cooperation with States of the region and ICC

2.8 Corrections: Support for the development and implementation of the multi-year joint United Nations justice programme; provision of support to national judicial processes for serious crimes

- Supports prison authorities in:
 - (a) institution-building;
 - (i) prison system reforms;
 - (ii) rehabilitation/construction of administrative and prison facilities;
 - (b) capacity-building;
 - (i) training of prison staff;
 - (ii) management of prison routine; (iii) prisoner rehabilitation programmes;
 - (iv) offenders management information system;
 - (v) management of juveniles in prisons; (vi) implementation of basic United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
- Through the Joint Human Rights Office: carries out the implementation of the judicial protection project on the protection of victims, witnesses and judicial personnel in the context of crimes against humanity and war crimes, focusing on sexual violence crime; provides support to judicial authorities in conducting investigations on allegations of serious human rights violations

- UN-Women: supports the PANZI Foundation on provision of legal assistance to victims of sexual and gender-based violence in South Kivu
- UNHCR: provides support to the development of legal framework for refugees, IDPs, stateless persons
- UNDP, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNODC and IOM: collaborate on: (i) rehabilitation and construction of prison infrastructure; and (ii) management of juveniles in prisons
- UNDP: provides technical expertise and support on resource mobilization
- WFP: provides support to feeding prisoners
- WHO: provides support for prisoners' health care

Mandated tasks

Security Council resolutions 2098 (2013), 2053 (2012), 1991 (2011), 1960 (2010), 1925 (2010), 1325 (2000)

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2.9 Extraction and trade of natural resources

Monitors mining sites in areas where State authority has been re-established and due diligence procedures are in place to ensure that mineral supply chain transparency is effective; supports the building of trading counters (*centres de négoce*)

IOM and UNDP: support the functioning and establishment of the *centres de négoce* with an increasing focus on the communities surrounding the mining areas with a view to mitigating conflicts related to the exploitation of, and transactions in, natural resources


3. Democratic institutions

Goal: Credible and legitimate political institutions are established

3.1 Electoral assistance: Support the organization of credible and transparent provincial and local elections, specifically training, capacity-building, logistics, good offices

Provides technical advice to the Independent National Electoral Commission secretariat in Kinshasa and 11 provincial secretariats and logistic support on the preparation and conduct of provincial, senatorial, gubernatorial and local elections, including the implementation of logistics and security plans and sensitization on the involvement and full-fledged participation of women in the electoral process; provides assistance to the Independent National Electoral Commission in the planning and management of provincial, senatorial, gubernatorial and local elections; provides good offices to resolve disputes and contentious issues related to the electoral process, including the acceptance of election results and peaceful installation of election institutions

- UNDP: strengthens the organizational and technical capacities of the Independent National Electoral Commission; reinforces the partnership among the Independent National Electoral Commission, public institutions and civil society organizations working on electoral observation, communication and women's involvement in the electoral and political processes; training staff of the Independent National Electoral Commission to oversee voter registration, logistics and voting
- UN-Women: provides technical support to the elaboration of the national strategy on women's political participation
- OHCHR: monitors and investigates human rights violations linked to the electoral process





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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 19 June 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Mohammed Tahir Khan has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

